Removal and the Eleventh Amendment: The Case for District Court Remand Discretion To Avoid a Bifurcated Suit by Berman, Mitchell N.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1993 
Removal and the Eleventh Amendment: The Case for District 
Court Remand Discretion To Avoid a Bifurcated Suit 
Mitchell N. Berman 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Litigation 
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Repository Citation 
Berman, Mitchell N., "Removal and the Eleventh Amendment: The Case for District Court Remand 
Discretion To Avoid a Bifurcated Suit" (1993). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2346. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2346 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
NOTES 
Removal and the Eleventh Amendment: The Case for District 
Court Remand Discretion To Avoid a Bifurcated Suit 
Mitchell N. Berman 
INTRODUCTION 
A plaintiff files suit in state court alleging a federal cause of action. 
The suit names two defendants, a private actor and a state actor. The 
private defendant, noting that the "civil action arises under federal 
law" and therefore falls within the federal courts' original federal 
question jurisdiction, 1 seeks to remove the case to federal court pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).2 In accord with federal procedures, she 
files a notice of removal in the federal district court for the district in 
which the state court resides.3 
The plaintiff, however, prefers that the case remain intact and that 
the state court adjudicate the claims against both defendants. He files 
a motion for remand in the federal court to which the private defend-
ant has removed the action. The plaintiff's motion argues that, be-
cause the Eleventh Amendment forbids the federal district court from 
exercising jurisdiction over the state defendant, 4 removal is improper. 
Federal courts have disagreed as to whether the private defendant 
1. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(a) (1988) permits defendants to remove actions over which the federal 
district courts have original jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying note 65. There are two 
main heads of original federal jurisdiction. In addition to the federal question jurisdiction of 
§ 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988) provides for original federal jurisdiction when the parties are 
of diverse citizenship. See infra note 67. 
The hypothetical in the text focuses with reason on federal question, rather than diversity, 
jurisdiction. The lion's share of this Note concerns discretionary remand of claims against pri-
vate defendants after the case has been properly removed. Part I will observe that cases involv-
ing state defendants are sometimes removable on federal question grounds, but never on the basis 
of diversity of citizenship. 
3. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
4. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Judicial con-
struction of the Amendment has departed far from its text. For example, the Supreme Court has 
held that the Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits against a state by its own citizens, 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890), and by foreign governments. Principality of Monaco v. 
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). It has also extended the Eleventh Amendment bar from "suits 
in law or equity" to suits in admiralty. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). For a brief 
overview of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see infra section I.A. For convenience, unless 
otherwise specified, mention in this Note of a claim against a state refers to a claim that is barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment. 
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can remove the claims against her, thereby bifurcating the plaintiff's 
suit, or whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents even the private 
defendant from securing a federal forum. The Fifth Circuit, in McKay 
v. Boyd Construction Co., 5 held that the Eleventh Amendment bars 
removal of all the claims in the case. It directed the district court to 
remand the claims against both defendants to the state court. 6 The 
Sixth Circuit, in Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer District, 7 repudiated 
McKay. The court held that a case naming both state and private de-
fendants was removable in its entirety, but that the federal district 
court must both remand the claims against the state defendant and 
adjudicate the claims against the private defendant. 
This Note concludes that the Sixth Circuit was half right: when a 
civil action names both state and private defendants - what this Note 
terms a "mixed case" - and when the claims against private defend-
ants arise under federal law, the district court must grant removal of 
the case8 and must remand the claims against the state defendant. 
However, this Note also observes that the Fifth Circuit probably 
achieved the better result. After defendants have removed a mixed 
case to federal court and the district court has remanded the barred 
claims, the dual court systems and the parties will usually benefit from 
disposition of the entire case in one proceeding. 
Accordingly, the significant question that Henry raises - but that 
the court failed to consider - is whether the district court may re-
mand the claims that it is permitted to hear, along with those claims 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars, to state court in order to avoid a 
bifurcated cause of action. This Note argues that, contrary to prevail-
ing wisdom, both the federal removal statutes and relevant Supreme 
Court precedent grant district courts sufficient discretion to remand 
such claims even though they fall within the federal courts' 
jurisdiction. 
Part I examines whether a private defendant may remove a case to 
federal court when the plaintiff's suit also names a state defendant. 
Part I briefly introduces both Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and 
5. 769 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1985). 
6. The Fifth Circuit analyzed the issue on the assumption that the private defendant had 
sought to remove the case on the basis of federal diversity jurisdiction. The court's analysis, 
however, would apply in an identical fashion had the private defendant invoked federal question 
jurisdiction. Indeed, three district courts in the Ninth Circuit followed McKay's reasoning in 
cases involving attempts to remove on the basis of federal question jurisdiction: Simmons v. 
California, 740 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Cal. 1990); Kelly v. California, 687 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Nev. 
1988), affd., 880 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1989); Stephans v. Nevada, 685 F. Supp. 217 (D. Nev. 1988). 
7. 922 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1990). 
8. This Note uses the terms civil action, suit, and case interchangeably, in accord with the 
Revision Notes to§ 1441. See, e.g., Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1066 (5th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1587 (1991). In the 1948 Revision, Congress replaced words like "case," 
"cause," and "suit" with the term "civil action" to harmonize the Judicial Code with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted 10 years earlier. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988) (historical and revi-
sion notes). 
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the federal removal statutes. It then demonstrates that no part of a 
mixed case is removable when the private defendant seeks to rely on 
the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. Lastly, it concludes that the 
presence of barred claims does not render nonremovable a civil action 
that lies within original federal question jurisdiction. A mixed case is 
removable in its entirety when the claim against the private defendant 
arises under federal law. 
Part II poses the question whether, after the federal district court 
remands the claims against the state defendant to state court, the fed-
eral court should remand or adjudicate the remaining claims against 
the private defendant. This Part argues that considerations of judicial 
economy and fairness will often recommend that the court remand the 
nonbarred claims as well. It proposes that the proper disposition of 
the claims against the private defendant can best be realized by invest-
ing the district court with ad hoc remand discretion. 
Whereas Part II is prescriptive, Parts III and IV are descriptive. 
Together, they conclude that the existing legal framework permits a 
district court to exercise remand discretion to avoid a bifurcated suit. 
Part III analyzes existing Supreme Court caselaw, focusing in particu-
lar on the Court's holding in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohil/ 9 
that a district court possesses discretion to remand pendent state law 
claims when it has assumed jurisdiction over a case via removal and all 
the federal question claims have been either resolved or dismissed. 
This Part concludes that Carnegie-Mellon is predicated on the Court's 
affirmation of inherent district court discretion to remand actions in 
the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. 
Such reasoning would permit remand discretion in Eleventh 
Amendment actions to prevent a bifurcated suit. 
Part IV begins by noting that, however the reasoning in Carnegie-
Mellon is characterized, its methodology is clear: the Supreme Court 
approved of extrastatutory remand discretion as an exercise of its com-
mon law power to supplement statutory rules of jurisdiction; it did not 
engage in statutory interpretation. This Part, consequently, under-
takes the oft-bypassed task of interpreting the remand provision, 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c).10 Employing standard methods of statutory con-
struction, Part IV determines that, properly understood, section 
1447(c) authorizes district court discretion to remand nonbarred fed-
eral question claims when necessary to avoid a bifurcated suit. This 
Note concludes that, whether applying the common law reasoning of 
Supreme Court precedent or undertaking statutory interpretation on 
its own, a federal district court confronting a removed mixed case can 
and should assume discretion to remand nonbarred federal question 
claims when remanding claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
9. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
10. This provision is reproduced infra in text accompanying note 78. 
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I. REMOVAL AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
This Part argues that the Eleventh Amendment permits removal of 
a case that contains federal question claims against private defendants 
even if the complaint names a state defendant. Sections I.A and LB 
respectively provide brief introductions to Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence and the removal statutes. The next two sections explore 
mixed-case removal. Section I.C examines mixed-case diversity re-
moval. It demonstrates that, aside from considerations of the 
Eleventh Amendment, the presence of a state defendant destroys com-
plete diversity. Accordingly, actions that name both state and private 
defendants are not removable on the basis of the federal courts' diver-
sity jurisdiction. Section I.D examines mixed-case federal question re-
moval. It concludes that mixed cases are removable when the barred 
claims and the nonbarred federal question claims are either "separate 
and independent" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), or part 
of a single civil action for purposes of section 1441(a). 
A. The Eleventh Amendment 
The passage of the Eleventh Amendment marked the first of what 
has proven to be that rare event in American democracy, a successful 
effort to overrule a Supreme Court decision by constitutional 
amendment. 11 In the offending case, Chisholm v. Georgia, 12 the 
Supreme Court upheld federal jurisdiction over an action to recover 
debts brought by a South Carolinian against the State of Georgia. 
Georgia had objected that sovereign immunity protected an uncon-
senting state from suit in federal court despite the second section of 
Article III, which extends the judicial power to "controversies . . . 
between a State and Citizens of another State." 13 A majority of the 
Justices, writing separately, adhered to the plain language of the con-
stitutional text and rejected Georgia's arguments that the provision 
was intended only to govern suits commenced by a state and did not 
reach actions in assumpsit. 14 Public reaction to Chisholm was so in-
tensely negative - largely, hi!?,torians generally agree, due to a fear of 
an avalanche of suits by British and Tory creditors to recover Revolu-
tionary War debts and seized property15 - that Congress proposed 
11. The most recent Supreme Court decision to provoke a serious effort to amend the 
Constitution was Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects burning of the U.S. flag). An amendment to prohibit desecration of the U.S. flag was 
defeated in the House by a narrow margin. See Steven A. Holmes, Amendment To Bar Flag 
Desecration Fails in the House, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1990, at Al. 
12. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
13. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1. Congress had actualized this power in the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
14. E.g., 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 467-69 (opinion of Cushing, J.); 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 476-77 (opin-
ion of Jay, C.J.). 
15. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
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and approved the Eleventh Amendment within three weeks of the 
Chisholm decision. The states ratified it in less than a year. 16 The 
Amendment provides: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."17 
Despite this compact history, the meaning and, therefore, the 
proper doctrinal contours of the Eleventh Amendment have been 
much debated. Scholars and Justices have advanced at least three dis-
tinct theories of the Amendment's intended purpose, each entailing 
different practical consequences. 18 First, the dominant view in 
Supreme Court caselaw is that the Amendment constitutionalizes state 
sovereign immunity, thereby preventing a state from being sued in fed-
eral court without its consent.19 Second, a minority of the Court, ini-
tially led by Justice Brennan, has come to view the Amendment solely 
as a restriction on federal diversity jurisdiction. Under this view, the 
Amendment does not bar actions based on the federal courts' federal 
question and admiralty jurisdiction.20 The third perspective urges that 
the Amendment was intended merely to reestablish the states' com-
mon law immunity that Chisholm had seemingly abrogated. This the-
ory would permit Congress, but not the federal bench, to authorize 
suits against a state in federal court.21 Given the impressive number of 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1987); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 99 (1932). But see CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 69-70 (1972) (arguing that, by the time 
of Chisholm, most states were willing and able to satisfy their outstanding debts). 
16. Nonetheless, for reasons of politics and administrative delay, Presidents Washington and 
Adams withheld recognition for three years. Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment is usually 
dated from 1798. See ORTH, supra note 15, at 20-21. 
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION§ 7.3 (1989) sets out the following use-
ful three-part schema. 
19. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 486-88 
(1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Principality of Monaco 
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-28 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1890). 
20. See, e.g., Welch, 483 U.S. at 509-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258-99 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In both Welch and Atascadero, 
Brennan came within one vote of overruling Hans. 
21. The principal articulation of this theory is found in Martha A. Field, The Eleventh 
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines (pts. 1 & 2), 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 1203 
(1977-1978). See also John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power To Create Causes of 
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in 
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federal-
ism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976). For a brief discussion of some of Field's disagreements with 
Tribe and Nowak, see Field, supra (pt. 2), at 1258-61 & n.259. 
Justice Brennan had espoused this third theory prior to adopting the "diversity theory" of the 
Amendment. See, e.g., Employees of the Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. 
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 309-22 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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commentators who have entered the debate in the last several years,22 
a thorough examination of the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 
theories is beyond the scope of this Note. Whatever may be the best 
historical understanding of the Amendment, most contemporary com-
mentators would agree with Judge Gibbons that "[t]he eleventh 
amendment today represents little more than a hodgepodge of confus-
ing and intellectually indefensible judge-made law."23 
An understanding of that hodgepodge begins with the 1890 case of 
Hans v. Louisiana. 24 In Hans, the Court expressly interpreted the 
Eleventh Amendment as the constitutionalization of state sovereign 
immunity.25 Hans held that the Amendment bars federal jurisdiction 
over suits against a state brought by that state's own citizens despite 
its explicit textual limitation to suits commenced by citizens of another 
state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.26 The Court has 
formally operated under this theory ever since, holding, for example, 
that the Amendment also bars suits in admiralty27 and suits brought 
by foreign countries.28 Similarly, the Court has declared that damages 
actions against state officers in their official capacities are barred when 
relief would run against the state treasury.29 
Against this broad deference to state sovereignty, however, the 
Court has weighed the competing need to vindicate the supremacy of 
federal law.30 Thus, it held early on that the Amendment does not 
22. Although a simple dichotomy necessarily oversimplifies, the present debate largely pits 
advocates of the diversity theory against its opponents. Compare Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty 
and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather 
Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & 
Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: The Coming Clash 
with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of Action over Which the Federal Courts Ha1•e 
Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645 (1988); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the 
Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. I (1988) and Lawrence C. 
Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989) (all 
critiquing Hans) with William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989) and Calvin R. Massey, State So1•ereignty 
and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989) (arguing that the "revi-
sionists" have not satisfied their heavy burden to change century-old doctrine). 
23. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (1983); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMER!· 
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173 (2d ed. 1988); George D. Brown, Has the Supreme Court Con-
fessed Error on the Eleventh Amendment? Revisionist Scholarship and State Immunity, 68 N.C. 
L. REV. 867, 891 (1990). 
24. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
25. 134 U.S. at 15. 
26. 134 U.S. at 15. 
27. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 498 (1921). 
28. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321-30 (1934). 
29. See, e.g .. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). Dam-
ages actions against officers in their individual capacities are not barred, even when state law 
would require indemnification. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 348. 
30. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 336-39. 
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preclude federal appellate review of state court decisions involving 
state defendants, reasoning in part that a writ of error is not a "suit."31 
Most significantly, in Ex parte Young 32 the Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over suits 
against individual state officers to enjoin violations of federal law. The 
Court explained that, because a state cannot authorize its functiona-
ries to violate federal law, any such conduct by an officer of the state is 
ultra vires and thereby unprotected by the state's immunity.33 
Although this reasoning has long struck commentators as fictional, 34 
the result seems essential to vindicate federal law.35 
The Court's ad hoc balancing of state and federal interests simi-
larly explains the bulk of Eleventh Amendment doctrine. In Edelman 
v. Jordan, 36 the Court refined Ex parte Young by holding that the 
latter permits prospective, but not retroactive, relief such as restitu-
tion, even while acknowledging that compliance with an injunction 
can impose a significant financial burden on the state itself. 37 The 
Amendment generally shields state agencies and departments, 38 but 
not counties or municipalities. 39 A state can waive its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity either by an unambiguous statement of intent40 
31. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379-83, 407-11 (1821). 
32. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
33. 209 U.S. at 159-60. 
34. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCA-
TION OF JUDICIAL POWER 193-203 (2d ed. 1990); TRIBE, supra note 23, at 189; 13 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3524, at 154 (1984); Gibbons, supra 
note 23, at 1891. Making the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment tum on whether the 
nominal defendant is a state officer or the state itself serves the fiction that federal courts heed the 
express constitutional command that they not hear suits in law or equity against the states. It is 
a rare exception to the principle that courts will not be misled by the nominal identification of 
parties. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 n.12 (1978); New Hampshire v. 
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88-91 (1883). 
35. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently acknowledged Young's fictional quality while re-
affirming its vitality. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984). 
36. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
37. 415 U.S. at 666-68. For cases evidencing the difficulty in applying the distinction be-
tween prospective and retrospective relief, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278-81 (1986); 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689-96 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1977). 
38. See, e.g., Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 
450 U.S. 147 (1981). For a discussion of the inconsistent law in this area, see 13 WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 34, § 3524, at 139-50; see also Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental 
Entities with Sovereign Immunity, 92 CoLUM. L. REV. 1243 (1992) (critiquing the Court's arm-
of-the-state doctrine). 
39. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Lincoln County v. 
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). Suits that name state officials are permissible only if the substantive 
law affords relief against the individual actor. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 
(1974). 
40. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987); 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) ("In deciding whether a State has waived its consti-
tutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated 'by the 
most express language or by such overwhelming implications [sic] from the text as [will] leave no 
room for any other reasonable construction.'") (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 
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or by voluntarily participating in conduct that Congress has expressly 
stated might subject the state to suit in federal court.41 
The Court also has recognized that Congress possesses some power 
to override the Amendment's bar by statute. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 42 
a unanimous Court held that Congress may override sovereign immu-
nity when legislating pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.43 More recently, the Court held five to four that Con-
gress may abridge the Eleventh Amendment when acting under the 
Commerce Clause.44 Whether the Court would likely find that Con-
gress enjoys a similar power when acting pursuant to its other consti-
tutional grants is uncertain.45 Clearly though, the Court will permit a 
statute to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity only when such 
congressional intent is unambiguous from the statute's face.46 
One of the most important recent cases demonstrating the Court's 
balancing approach to the Eleventh Amendment is Pennhurst State 
School & Hospital v. Halderman. 47 Emphasizing that the federal inter-
est that underlies the Young fiction - the interest in enforcing federal 
law - does not apply when plaintiffs allege state violations of state 
law, the Pennhurst Court held that the federal courts cannot entertain, 
via pendent jurisdiction, state law claims for injunctive relief against 
state officials. 48 
U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). Given this exacting standard, courts will not deem a state to forfeit its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity merely by signing a notice of removal. Equitable sensibilities 
may suggest that a state, intending not to waive its immunity, should not be allowed to remove a 
mixed case for the sole purpose of forcing the action to be bifurcated with the hope that plaintifi' 
will pursue only her claims in federal court against the private defendants. The conclusion does 
not follow, however, that a state should be barred from removing a mixed case unless it also 
waives its immunity. The likely result of such a rule - the state's withholding of its consent 
from the removal petition - would be just as unfair to the private defendants who prefer a 
federal forum. The better conclusion is that, in its exercise of remand discretion, the district 
court should properly consider whether removal was sought - by either private or state defend· 
ants - for the strategic reason of pressuring the plaintiff to forgo a legitimate claim. See infra 
note 185. 
41. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985). 
42. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri· 
ate legislation, the provisions of this article."). 
44. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14 (1989). 
45. Parts of the plurality's reasoning in Union Gas appear to limit the case's holding to the 
Commerce Clause. See 491 U.S. at 16-19 (emphasizing the self-executing nature of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause). Justice White cast the deciding vote on the constitutional question, re-
marking only: "I agree with the conclusion reached by [the plurality], that Congress has the 
authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although 
I do not agree with much of [its] reasoning." 491 U.S. at 57 (White, J., concurring). 
46. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does 
not contain sufficient evidence of congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
immunity). 
47. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). The litigants had appeared before the Court previously. See 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). It is the second case that is of 
interest to this Note, whether referred to as Pennhurst or Pennhurst II. 
48. Pennhurst fl 465 U.S. at 103-06. Scholars have criticized Pennhurst for ignoring a re-
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The final question, most relevant for the issue of mixed-case re-
moval, is whether the Eleventh Amendment applies to individual 
claims or to entire cases. In other words, is a suit "against the state" if 
some but not all claims are against a state? The issue was surely of 
little moment when the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, given com-
mon law rules that effectively limited suits to a single cause of action.49 
With the advent of more permissive joinder rules begun by New 
York's Field Code in 1848, courts came in a variety of contexts to 
equate "suit" with "claim."5° Consistent with this approach, the 
Supreme Court long assumed, apparently without discussion, that the 
Eleventh Amendment bar applies to individual claims,· in cases filed in 
federal court, the Supreme Court has routinely heard nonbarred fed-
eral question claims after dismissing claims against the state.51 In ap-
plying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state law claims, the 
Pennhurst Court brought the operation of the bar into sharp relief: "A 
federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court's 
jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."52 
A federal court must both hear nonbarred federal question claims53 
and dismiss the barred ones. Because the plaintiff could then pursue 
the dismissed claims in state court, 54 the final result might be two sep-
arate actions in state and federal court. 
Pennhurst involved a suit brought originally in federal court. In 
lated federal interest: plaintiffs should not be required to forfeit their state law claims as the price 
for seeking federal enforcement of their federal claims. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Beyond 
Pennhurst: Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress To 
Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343 (1985); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment After 
Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HAsr. CoNsr. L.Q. 643 (1985); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: 
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984). But see Ann 
Althouse, How To Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1485 (1987) (arguing that Pennhurst advances the national interest in the effective functioning of 
states as independent entities). 
49. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914-16 (1987). 
50. See, e.g., Hammer v. British Type Investors, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 497, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) 
("[W)here wholly independent causes of action ... are joined in one suit merely to eliminate 
separate trials, the proceeding is to be regarded as a combination of suits."). 
51. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
52. 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984) (emphasis added). 
53. The district court likely would also have discretion to hear or dismiss any nonbarred 
supplemental state law claims. See infra notes 268-70 and accompanying text. 
54. A state may permit itself to be sued in its own courts even if it does not waive its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in federal court. See, e.g, Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. 
v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147, 149 (1981). A 1977 survey found that at least half 
the states had, by statute or judicial decision, abrogated or curtailed their immunity in their own 
courts. See Comment, Avoiding the Eleventh Amendment: A Survey of Escape Devices, 1977 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 644 n.114. 
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Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer District, ss the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that the result should be the same - that is, two separate actions - if 
the plaintiff had originally filed the mixed case in state court and the 
defendants had sought to remove. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit case, 
McKay v. Boyd Construction Co., s6 held that a mixed case filed origi-
nally in state court cannot be removed in whole or part by the defend-
ants. s7 Resolving this conflict requires a brief review of removal. 
B. Removal 
Removal is a statutory procedure whereby defendants may transfer 
an action from state to federal court. ss Congress created the right of 
removal in the Judiciary Act of l 789S9 to shield out-of-state defend-
ants from local prejudice.60 When, in 1875, Congress provided for 
original federal jurisdiction over suits arising under federal law, 61 it 
also extended the removal privilege from diversity to federal question 
cases. 62 Although Congress has tinkered frequently with its grants of 
removal authority,63 the basic removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), 
has changed little since 1887.64 The current law reads in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil 
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and 
55. 922 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1990). For fuller discussion of this case, see infra notes 114·26 
and accompanying text. 
56. 769 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of McKay, see infra notes 112-13 and 
accompanying text. 
57. Although McKay certainly reaches this result, it is not clear that the court contemplated 
that there should be different final results depending upon whether plaintiff or defendants sought 
the federal forum. On its face, the McKay opinion suggests that the court might simply have 
misread Pennhurst to dictate that a district court dismiss the entirety of a mixed case even when 
brought by a plaintiff invoking the court's original jurisdiction. Because this reading is demon-
strably wrong, section l.D.2 assesses an alternative rationale that could support the McKay hold-
ing. See infra notes 131-50 and accompanying text. 
58. Removal is not mentioned in the Constitution and was unknown at common law. See 
Bradford G. Swing, Federal Common Law Power To Remand a Properly Removed Case, 136 U. 
PA. L. REV. 583, 587 (1987). Nonetheless, the constitutionality of the general removal power is 
firmly established. See, e.g., City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Tennessee v. 
Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879). Today the removal statutes comprise chapter 89 of the Judicial 
Code. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
59. Ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789). 
60. See, e.g., Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 341 (1976) (noting the 
district court's observation "that the purpose of the removal statute was to prevent prejudice in 
local courts"); 14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 34, § 3721 nn.6.1, 7 (1985 & Supp. 1993). For a 
different explanation of the creation of original diversity jurisdiction, see infra note 94. 
61. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470; see infra note 164. 
62. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
63. See IA JAMES w. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 0.156 (2d ed. 1993). 
64. Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by Act of August 13, 1888, ch. 866, 
25 Stat. 433. 
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division embracing the place where such action is pending. 65 
Generally, then, a defendant can remove any suit that the plaintiff 
originally could have brought in federal court on either federal ques-
tion66 or diversity67 grounds, subject to four qualifications. First, since 
the plaintiff is "master of his claim," and can choose not to plead fed-
eral claims that his facts would have supported, 68 a defendant cannot 
remove state law claims on the mere ground that, on the same facts, 
plaintiff could have alleged a federal cause of action. 69 Second, diver-
sity cases are not removable so long as any defendant is a citizen of the 
state in which the plaintiff brings suit. 70 Third, because Congress has 
"otherwise expressly provided," there are a limited number of situa-
tions in which the plaintiff's choice of forum is absolute.71 Fourth, 
several provisions, both within72 and outside of73 chapter 89, invest 
65. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(a) (1988). 
66. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). 
67. 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 
between-
(1) Citizens of different States; 
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; 
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are 
additional parties; and 
( 4) a foreign state ... as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States. 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988). 
68. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983) (" '[T)he party who brings a suit is 
master to decide what law he will rely upon.' ") (quoting Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 
U.S. 22, 25 (1913)). 
69. On the other hand, the well-pleaded complaint rule that removal, like original, jurisdic-
tion only lies if a federal question appears on the face of the complaint, induces the corollary that 
a plaintiff cannot defeat removability by "artfully pleading" what is necessarily a question of 
federal law as a state law claim. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Intl. Assn. of 
Machinists, 376 F.2d 337, 339-340 (6th Cir. 1967), ajfd., 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 
70. 
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a 
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be 
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such 
action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988). That is, if a plaintiff could have sued in federal court on diversity 
grounds, but chooses to sue in the home state of one of the defendants, the action becomes 
nonremovable. 
71. See generally IA MOORE ET AL., supra note 63, at 11 0.167[1). 
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 144l(d) (1988) (foreign state defendants); 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(l) (1988) 
(prosecution of, or suit against, a federal officer); 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1988) (members of the 
armed forces); 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1988) (suits in which the defendant will be unable to secure 
federal civil rights in the state court); 28 U.S.C. § 1444 (1988) (foreclosure actions brought 
against the United States). 
73. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1988) (allowing removal of arbitration agreements falling under 
the Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention); 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1988) (involving international or 
foreign banking); 12 U.S.C § 1819(b) (Supp. IV 1992) (permitting removal by the FDIC); 22 
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defendants with a right to remove cases over which federal courts 
would otherwise lack original jurisdiction. 
On paper, removal procedure is straightforward.74 Defendants75 
who wish to remove any civil action pending in state court must file a 
notice of removal in the U.S. district court for the district and division 
in which such action is pending.76 They must also file a copy of the 
notice in the state court and give written notice to all adverse parties. 
At this point, removal is effective, and the state court shall proceed no 
further unless and until the federal district court remands the case. 77 
Section 1447(c) ostensibly governs a district court's power to remand. 
It reads in relevant part: 
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal proce-
dure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of re-
moval under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it 
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 
shall be remanded. 78 
Common wisdom held for years that, with one exception, 79 section 
1447(c) sets forth the exclusive bases for remand: defect in removal 
procedure and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.80 In 1988, in 
U.S.C. § 286(g) (1988) (permitting removal by the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 
74. As is often the case, however, practice comports imperfectly with theory. See, e.g., Smith 
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 612 F. Supp .. 364, 365 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (removal is "fraught with 
arcane mysteries ... [and] filled with technical pitfalls for the unwary"). Confusion attaches to 
such seemingly simple details as determining the date from which the 30-day time limit for re-
moval runs. See Robert P. Faulkner, The Courtesy Copy Trap: Untimely Removal from State to 
Federal Court, 52 Mo. L. REV. 374 (1993). 
75. The phrase used in § 1446(a), "defendant or defendants," has long been construed as 
requiring all defendants to join in a petition for removal. See, e.g., Chicago, Rock I. & Pac. Ry. 
v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900). Despite the American Law Institute's 1968 proposal that 
the rule be abolished, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIC· 
TION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5, at 217-18 (1967) 
[hereinafter ALI STUDY DRAFT No. 5] (commentary to § 1381), it is still the law. See, e.g., 
Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988); Getty Oil Corp. v. 
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 (5th Cir. 1988). 
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1988). The defendant must file the notice within 30 days from 
receipt either of the initial pleading, or, if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, 
of the amended pleading that first confers removability. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988). 
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1988). It bears emphasis that removal is automatic upon the de· 
fendants' completion of the procedural requisites; removability is challenged by a motion to re-
mand. See 14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 34, § 3730, at 500; ALI STUDY DRAFT No. 5, supra 
note 75, at 217 (commentary to § 1381). Presumably to reflect this fact, Congress amended 
§ 1446 in 1988 by substituting the phrase "notice of removal" for "petition for removal." 
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 
4669 (1988). Thus, the practical import of a determination that a mixed case is not removable 
would be that the district court must remand the entirety of the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988). 
79. The one exception is for cases that are removed pursuant to§ 1441(c). That provision 
specifically authorizes a limited degree of remand discretion. See infra text accompanying note 
103. 
80. See infra note 191. 
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Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 81 the Supreme Court firmly re-
jected that view. It held that district courts may remand pendent 
claims after federal question claims have been eliminated notwith-
standing that the claims remain within the federal courts' subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. However, the potential scope of Carnegie-Mellon's 
holding remains unclear. Lower courts and commentators differ re-
garding precisely what circumstances might justify remand. 82 Parts 
III and IV of this Note will argue that both Supreme Court precedent 
and the removal statutes, properly construed, entrust the district court 
with discretion to remand actions to prevent a bifurcated cause of ac-
tion. The inquiry in those two Parts is predicated, of course, on the 
conclusion that mixed cases are removable. The following sections ex-
amine whether a private defendant may remove a mixed case on the 
basis of either diversity or federal question jurisdiction. 83 
C. Mixed-Case Diversity Removal 
A first glance suggests that the mixed-case removal puzzle could 
arise if, for example, a Michigan resident sues a citizen of Ohio and the 
state of Indiana on state law claims in Michigan state court. 84 In fact, 
the Fifth Circuit assumed in McKay v. Boyd Construction Co. 85 that 
the private defendant based his petition for removal on diversity of 
citizenship between itself and the plaintiff, rather than on the existence 
of a federal question. 86 It then implicitly posed the question of mixed-
case diversity removal: Is an action over which diversity jurisdiction 
lies removable when the Eleventh Amendment bars one of the claims? 
This section reveals that the problem of mixed-case diversity removal, 
as addressed by the McKay court, is illusory. Regardless of the 
Eleventh Amendment, federal diversity jurisdiction cannot lie over an 
81. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
82. See infra section III.B. 
83. This Note addresses only whether mixed cases are removable pursuant to§ 144l(a) and 
(c). It does not expressly consider, for example, attempts by federal officers to remove cases 
pursuant to§ 1442. The specialized removal provisions outside of§ 1441 are discussed only to 
the extent they shed light on the proper scope of district court remand discretion. See infra notes 
294-95 and accompanying text. 
84. Although the Constitution requires that suits between states be heard in federal court, 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, no federal law prevents states from hearing suits prosecuted by citizens 
against other states. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
85. 769 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1985). 
86. Although the defendant Boyd was a citizen of the state in which McKay sued, and there-
fore was prevented by§ 144l(b) from removing the case on diversity grounds, the court found 
that McKay waived this defect. 769 F.2d at 1087. 
Incidentally, the court's assumption that Boyd intended to ground removal in the district 
court's diversity jurisdiction was erroneous. Boyd's removal sought to invoke federal question 
jurisdiction over McKay's claim that the defendants' failure to erect a guardrail as required by 
federal highway construction regulations constituted negligence per se. Telephone Interview 
with Lealand Smith, Attorney at Boyd's counsel McCoy, Wilkins, Stephens & Tipton (June 7, 
1993). 
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action to which a state is a party.87 
It is firmly settled that a suit between a state and a citizen of an-
other state does not support federal diversity jurisdiction "for a State 
cannot in the nature of things be a citizen of any State."88 Notwith-
standing the certainty that a state cannot create diversity of citizen-
ship, the lower federal courts have divided over the question whether 
the joinder of a state defendant destroys complete diversity when diver-
sity holds between the plaintiff and all private defendants. 89 This con-
fusion arises from an ambiguity within the rule of complete diversity. 
In its classic statement, the complete diversity rule establishes that 
diversity jurisdiction is unavailable unless each plaintiff could invoke 
diversity jurisdiction against each defendant.90 So stated, the require-
ment of complete diversity would deny diversity jurisdiction over 
every case in which a state is a party. However, alternate statements 
of the rule lead to a different result. If complete diversity requires only 
that "no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any defend-
87. The discussion that follows a5sumes that a party shielded by the Eleventh Amendment 
will also be deemed the state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Of course, the converse is not 
always true, thanks to the rule of Ex parte Young. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
To be sure, " '[t]he tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and 
so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all 
of them ... must constantly be guarded against.' " ROGER c. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 91 (4th ed. 1987) (quoting Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 
CAN. B. REV. 535, 575 (1959) (quoting WALTER w. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES 
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1942))). Courts have, however, applied the same "real party in 
interest" test to determine whether a nominal party is the state for both diversity and Eleventh 
Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Northeast Fed. Credit Union v. Neves, 837 F.2d 531, 533-34 
(1st Cir. 1988); Tradigrain v. Mississippi State Port Auth., 701 F.2d 1131, 1132 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(observing that the analysis is "virtually identical whether the case involves a determination of 
immunity under the eleventh amendment or a determination of citizenship for diversity jurisdic-
tion"); Adden v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1982); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 
F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 1981); Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Rosemount Memorial Park Assn., 598 
F.2d 1303, 1306 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Whether a particular case involves a question of diversity juris-
diction, or Eleventh Amendment prohibition, the initial inquiry is the same: is the state a real 
party in interest to the litigation?") (footnotes omitted). For a critique of the application of 
identical rules in the different contexts, see Ramada Inns, 598 F.2d at 1308-11 (Seitz, C.J., 
concurring). 
88. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430, 433 (1886); see also State Highway Commn. v. 
Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1929); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 
487 (1894). 
89. Compare Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 414-17 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and 
McKnight v. Broedell, 212 F. Supp. 45, 47 (E.D. Mich. 1962) ("[A] state is not a citizen of any 
state and, therefore, if made a party in a diversity action would destroy jurisdiction.") with 
United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd., 482 F. Supp. 541, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ("Thejoindcr of 
CDB would not contravene [the complete diversity] rule, since CDB ... is not a citizen for 
diversity purposes and thus is not a co-citizen of plaintiff United.") and Laird v. Chrysler Corp., 
92 F.R.D. 473 (D. Mass. 1981) ("Since Rhode Island is not a citizen for diversity purposes, it 
cannot be a co-citizen of any party and could not destroy the diversity jurisdiction already estab-
lished.'') (citations and footnotes omitted). 
90. See, e.g., Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989) ("When a 
plaintiff sues more than one defendant in a diversity action, the plaintiff must meet the require-
ments of the diversity statute for each defendant or face dismissal.'' (citing Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806))). 
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ant,"91 then adding a state defendant would not destroy diversity so 
long as the other parties are diverse. Because these alternate formula-
tions produce the same result in the ordinary case, the potential ten-
sion between the two has apparently gone unnoticed.92 To resolve the 
conflict requires examination of the purposes underlying the complete 
diversity rule. 
The original rationale for the complete diversity rule is obscure.93 
Indeed, the rule seems contrary to the purpose underlying the grant of 
diversity jurisdiction - to protect out-of-state parties from local prej-
udice. 94 That rationale, logically extended, would dictate that, if a 
91. E.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Sheboygan Falls, 713 F.2d 1261, 1264 (7th Cir. 1983). 
92. For example, in Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), the 
Supreme Court apparently endorsed both statements of the rule. Compare 437 U.S. at 373 
("[D]iversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from 
each plaintiff.") with 437 U.S. at 374 ("[D]iversity jurisdiction is not to be available when any 
plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as any defendant."). Of course, these formulations are not 
logically incompatible. The apparent inconsistency arises only because, and to the extent that, 
the latter statement conventionally implies its converse. Strangely, the Capital Development 
Board court supported its conclusion that the presence of a state party is not diversity-destroying 
with reference to the much less helpful former statement. See 482 F. Supp. at 546. 
93. The rule is not a constitutional requirement, see, e.g., State Fann Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967), but rather a product of statutory construction. The 
Judiciary Act of 1789, enacting the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction, was first con-
strued to require complete diversity by Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 267 (1806). Unfortunately, the opinion does not explain the reasons for its interpreta-
tion. The conventional assumption is that the Chief Justice reasoned that "the presence of resi-
dents of the same state on both sides of the lawsuit neutralizes any bias in favor of residents." 
National Assn. of Realtors v. National Real Estate Assn., 894 F.2d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1990); see 
also 1 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIT-
TEE: WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 540 (1990) [hereinafter STUDY COM-
MITTEE PAPERS]; David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part L 
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (1968). This theory is problematic because, as Professor Currie ac-
knowledged, it is far too narrow to support the complete diversity rule. It surely stretches credi-
bility to claim that, for instance, the presence of a resident of Ohio as a plaintiff, in a suit filed in 
Michigan state court by a dozen Michiganders against an Ohioan, will "neutralize" any potential 
forum bias. Perhaps it was recognition of the illogic of his rule that accounted for Marshall's 
alleged subsequent regret of his Strawbridge opinion. See Louisville, C., & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 
U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555-56 (1844). 
Then again, perhaps the compfete diversity rule rested on other foundations. See Richard D. 
Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34, 41 
("Only some policy, which Congress did not state and which Chief Justice Marshall declined to 
discuss in Strawbridge, could have justified the narrower construction."). 
94. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 34, § 3601 nn.14-25. The Supreme Court first ar-
ticulated this rationale in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 89 (1809), 
overruled on other grounds by Louisville, C., & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 559 
(1844). Since then, several leading scholars have suggested that the Framers' real concern was to 
protect commercial interests from state courts animated by democratic-agrarian bias. See, e.g., 
John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 
22-28 (1948); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State 
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 521-22 (1928); see also Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 495-99 (1928) (suggesting that the Framers feared 
the state legislatures' ability to pass debtor relief laws, and generally to control the state courts, 
rather than direct bias by the state courts themselves). Nonetheless, courts today routinely in-
voke the local bias rationale. See, e.g., Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1980); Risk 
v. Kingdom of Norway, 707 F. Supp. 1159, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1989), ajfd. sub nom. Risk v. 
Halvorsen, 936 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 880 (1992). 
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plaintiff chooses to prosecute a suit against citizens of different states, 
an out-of-state defendant should be able either to separate and remove 
all claims asserted only against herself or to remove the entire case, 
carrying all defendants from the forum state along to federal court. 
Commentators have criticized the requirement of complete diversity 
for frustrating this logical result.95 Nonetheless, it remains the law. 
Accordingly, the present need is not to discover the complete diversity 
rule's historical justification, but to identify the function that it cur-
rently serves.96 
The most reasonable hypothesis is that the complete diversity rule 
today serves simply to limit diversity jurisdiction.97 The rule reflects 
the prevailing judgment of both Congress and the courts that the need 
to provide a federal forum for every party who might be subjected to 
local bias is not sufficiently compelling either to justify a bifurcated 
suit or to afford a federal forum to those parties who lack an independ-
ent basis for federal jurisdiction. In recent years, Congress has acted 
repeatedly to prevent a party with a claim to the federal courts' diver-
sity jurisdiction from securing a federal forum at the expense of either 
a bifurcated suit or the expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction to 
embrace nondiverse parties.98 Similarly, the Supreme Court has ap-
proved application of the stringent completeness requirement to alien-
age jurisdiction, observing in recent dicta that the presence of a 
"stateless" entity does destroy complete diversity.99 
95. Reasoning that local prejudice can be directed against out-of-state defendants joined to 
an in-state defendant, the American Law Institute proposed that the complete diversity require-
ment be abolished in "case[s] involving several liability or liability in the alternative.'' 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, at 87 (1964) (commentary to § 1305); see also 
Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal 
Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1803-06 
(1992). 
96. Cf. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 23, at 128-29 (4th ed. 1983) 
("The conditions that existed, or were feared to exist, in 1789 are irrelevant in determining the 
continued necessity for diversity jurisdiction .... [T]he decision to retain or abolish such jurisdic-
tion today must depend on the utility of the jurisdiction in today's society."). 
97. Diversity jurisdiction has provoked pointed scholarly criticism. For a partial list of con-
tributions to the debate, see WRIGHT, supra note 96, at 130 nn.16-17. 
98. First, Congress amended § 1441(c) to deny removability if the "separate and independ-
ent" claim is based on diversity jurisdiction. See infra note 105. Second, in codifying supplemen-
tal jurisdiction, Congress agreed with the result in Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 
U.S. 365 (1978), and specified that original diversity jurisdiction will not support supplemental 
jurisdiction over nondiverse parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (Supp. IV 1992). Two years earlier, 
Congress etrected the same policy in § 1447(e): "If after removal the plaintitr seeks to join addi-
tional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny 
joinder, or permitjoinder and remand the action to the State court." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1988). 
The legislative history reveals that Congress considered the "obvious alternative" of also author-
izing district courts to permit joinder and retain jurisdiction, but adopted "[t]he more modest 
approach ... in order to avoid the opposition that might be encountered by a proposal that 
would provide a small enlargement of diversity jurisdiction.'' H.R. REP. No. 889, lOOth Cong., 
2d Sess. 73 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033-34. 
99. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989). The plaintitr in 
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These facts all indicate that the complete diversity rule is more 
practical than principled. If there exists a reason to provide a federal 
forum merely because the two parties to a suit are citizens of different 
states, that reason does not necessarily disappear upon the addition of 
a nondiverse litigant. The unavailability of diversity jurisdiction in 
such cases manifests congressional and judicial intent to fix diversity 
jurisdiction at its irreducible minimum. This theory controls cases 
naming both state and private defendants: because a suit against only 
a state would not support diversity jurisdiction, addition of diverse 
private defendants cannot create it. Put differently, the first character-
ization of the complete diversity rule is correct: " 'between ... citizens 
of different States' ... mean[s] citizens of different States and no one 
else."100 Because a plaintiff and a state defendant cannot be "citizens 
of different states," federal courts lack diversity jurisdiction over a 
case to which a state is a party. Consequently, independent of the 
operation of the Eleventh Amendment, defendants cannot remove a 
mixed case on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 
D. Mixed-Case Federal Question Removal 
Given that diversity jurisdiction will not support mixed-case re-
moval, the final question for this Part is whether federal question juris-
diction will. That is, can a mixed case be removed if the claims against 
the private defendant arise under federal law - as defined by 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 ?101 This section examines the two avenues by which 
Newman-Green, a citizen of Illinois, had brought a contract action against foreign citizens and 
Bettison, a U.S. citizen domiciled in Venezuela. The court of appeals raised the question of 
jurisdiction sua sponte and determined that the presence of defendant Bettison destroyed diver-
sity jurisdiction for two reasons: Bettison's U.S. citizenship destroyed complete alienage jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) ("citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign 
state"); and his "stateless status" prevented satisfaction of the state-diversity predicate of 
§ 1332(a)(3) ("citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are 
additional parties"). Newman-Green Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 832 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1987) (per 
Easterbrook, J.), ajfd., 854 F.2d 916 (1988) (en bane), revd., 490 U.S. 826 (1989). Although 
federal courts had established that a U.S. citizen domiciled abroad is not a foreign subject for 
purposes of§ 1332(a)(2), see, e.g., Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1980), in 
Newman-Green, the Seventh Circuit took the (unnoted) further step of imposing a stringent 
"complete alienage" condition. 
The narrow issue presented on certiorari was whether the court of appeals could dismiss 
Bettison's complaint pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to 
produce diversity, or whether it had to remand to the district court for the same purpose. The 
Supreme Court's statement that a stateless entity destroys complete diversity occurred in passing 
and without discussion. Nonetheless, if the presence of a stateless U.S. citizen destroys complete 
alienage jurisdiction, it follows a fortiori that the presence of a state destroys complete diversity 
jurisdiction. This is so because, although it is seemingly uncontroversial that diversity jurisdic-
tion should not lie over an action between a state and a citizen of another state, common sense 
suggests that a case between a state citizen and a U.S. citizen domiciled abroad should support 
diversity jurisdiction. See Meyers v. Smith, 460 F. Supp. 621, 624 (D.D.C. 1978) (calling the 
treatment of nonresident U.S. citizens a "loophole in 28 U.S.C. § 1332"); Currie, supra note 93, 
at 9-10. 
100. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 547, 552 (1989). 
101. For purposes of this Part it makes no difference whether the claims against the state 
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defendants might remove a case containing federal question claims -
sections 144l(a) and 1441(c). 
Section 1441(a) provides for removal of "any civil action brought 
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have 
original jurisdiction."102 Accordingly, it would seem that a mixed 
case is removable pursuant to section 1441(a) if the presence of a fed-
eral question claim confers original jurisdiction over a civil action 
notwithstanding the joinder of a state defendant. Section 144l{c) 
provides: 
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the 
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title, is joined with one or 
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case 
may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, 
or, in its discretion, may ... remand all matters in which State law 
predominates.103 
Unlike section 1441(a), which discusses civil actions, section 1441(c) 
speaks explicitly of removable and nonremovable claims. By render-
ing it unnecessary to determine whether there is original jurisdiction 
over a case containing a barred claim, section 1441(c) provides an ana-
lytically simpler introduction to mixed-case removal. 
1. Removal of ''Separate and Independent" Claims 
Consider a hypothetical case brought in state court consisting of 
two separate and independent claims, A and B. By the express terms 
of section 1441(c), if claim A falls within original federal question 
jurisdiction, and claim B does not, the defendant can remove the entire 
case. Section 1441 ( c) further provides that, after the case has been 
removed, the district court has discretion to hear or remand "all mat-
ters in which State law predominates." The mixed-case wrinkle arises 
when claim B - whether a state or federal claim - is barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. Supreme Court precedent flatly forbids federal 
courts from hearing claim B. 104 Thus, for purposes of section 1441 ( c ), 
the only difference between a mixed case and a civil action consisting 
of separate and independent claims, none of which implicate the 
Eleventh Amendment is that in the former event the district court 
may not "determine all issues therein." When a defendant removes a 
civil action in which a federal question claim is joined to a separate 
and independent claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the dis-
defendant arise under state or federal law or whether the private defendant faces claims arising 
under state law in addition to the federal question claims. See infra note 119. This Note does 
not, however, advocate federal question removal of mixed cases in which the only federal causes 
of action name state defendants. See infra note 151. 
102. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
103. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(c) (Supp. IV 1992). 
104. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
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trict court must, therefore, (a) allow removal of the entire action; and 
(b) remand the barred claim. 
The McKay court adopted this analysis when it asserted that if 
section 1441(c) applied, 105 then the private defendant "could secure 
removal of the case against it"106 despite the presence of a barred 
claim. However, the court rightly found that section 1441(c) did not 
apply because the claims arose from an "interlocked series of transac-
tions" and were not therefore "separate and independent."107 The dis-
trict courts in the Ninth Circuit that followed McKay reached the 
same result. 1os Two conclusions follow. On one hand, a defendant 
can remove a mixed case when a barred claim is separate and in-
dependent from a nonbarred federal question claim. At this point, the 
district court must remand the barred claims and hear all nonbarred 
federal question claims. On the other hand, the likelihood that the 
claims will in fact be "separate and independent" is sure to be small. 109 
105. At the time of McKay, § 144l(c) read as follows: 
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if 
sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of 
action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues 
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original 
jurisdiction. 
28 U.S.C. § 144l(c) (1988). The 1990 amendment makes two changes: (1) the independent 
claim is no longer removable on diversity grounds; and (2) the district court now has discretion 
to remand some claims that technically fall within its original jurisdiction. Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, § 312, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114. These changes do not affect the 
analysis of this section. Both changes are, however, relevant to this Note. See supra note 98 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text. 
106. McKay v. Boyd Constr. Co., 769 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1985). It appears that the 
court is using the word case colloquially. Of course, the "case" against the state defendant could 
still not be heard by the district court. 
107. "'[W]here there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising from an 
interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action 
under§ 1441(c).'" 769 F.2d at 1087 (quoting American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 
(1951)). 
Before the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the presence in a larger lawsuit of a single 
"controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully deter-
mined as between them" allowed the defendants to that controversy to remove the entire action. 
28 U.S.C. § 71 (1946). The Supreme Court crafted its restrictive "separate and independent" test 
in Finn to comport with supposed congressional intent to limit the availability of removal. Finn, 
341 U.S. at 9-12. For an argument that Congress did not intend to restrict removal of what had 
been termed "separable controversies," see Arthur J. Keeffe et al., Venue and Removal Jokers in 
the New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REV. 569, 598-612 (1952). 
108. See Simmons v. California, 740 F. Supp. 781, 788-89 (E.D. Cal. 1990); Kelly v. 
California, 687 F. Supp. 1494, 1496 (D. Nev. 1988), ajfd., 880 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1989) (both 
agreeing that removal of the nonbarred claim would be proper if the claims were separate and 
independent, but also finding that, in fact, the claims were intertwined). 
109. Indeed, several commentators have speculated that, in practice, the supplemental juris-
diction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, will render § 144l(c) moot. See, e.g., David D. Siegel, 
Commentary 0111990 Revision, in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441, at 5-6 (West Supp. 1993) (observing that if 
a claim is not supplemental to a federal question claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and thus not 
removable under § 144l(a), but is "separate and independent" for purposes of § 144l(c), it is 
likely not to be part of a single constitutional case). For the text of§ 1367, see infra text accom-
panying note 268. 
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2. Removal Pursuant to Section 144J(a) 
The more difficult - and contested - issue is whether a mixed 
case is removable pursuant to section 1441(a), which provides for re-
moval of any "civil action" of which the federal district courts have 
original jurisdiction. This section proceeds in several steps. First, it 
introduces the facts of the two leading cases, McKay v. Boyd Construc-
tion Co., 110 and Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer District. 111 It then pur-
sues Henry's characterization of the pivotal legal dispute - whether 
the Eleventh Amendment bars claims or cases - and concludes that 
Henry is right and McKay wrong. This section proceeds to note, how-
ever, that McKay need not be read simply as misconstruing Supreme 
Court precedent. Consequently this section teases from McKay and its 
progeny a way of analyzing the problem that Henry entirely overlooks: 
the McKay line of cases can be read to indicate that the Eleventh 
Amendment's operation upon claims forecloses a finding that jurisdic-
tion lies over the mixed case, and thereby prevents removal. This sec-
tion critiques and rejects this latter approach. It concludes that, 
regardless of the McKay court's intended reasoning, its holding is not 
salvageable. Mixed cases are removable. 
The plaintiff in McKay v. Boyd Construction Co. brought a dam-
ages action in state court against the Mississippi State Highway 
Department and a private contractor, alleging negligent construction 
of a bridge abutment. The district court in McKay had granted de-
fendants' removal petition, dismissed the claims against the highway 
department as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and granted sum-
mary judgment for the private contractor.112 On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit ordered the entire action remanded to the state court, holding 
nonremovable any suit containing barred claims: 
The decision of the district court must be vacated because this suit does 
not fall within the limited jurisdiction of the district court .... [Section 
1441] only authorizes the removal of actions that are within the original 
jurisdiction of the district court. Because a state agency is a defendant, 
the eleventh amendment bars the exercise of federal jurisdiction here. 
The eleventh amendment denies courts of the United States jurisdic-
tion over any action wherein a state or a state agency or department is 
named as defendant. 113 
110. 769 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1985). 
111. 922 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1990). 
112. 769 F.2d at 1086. 
113. 769 F.2d at 1086 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit assumed that the defendants 
invoked the district court's diversity jurisdiction. However, the court's reasoning - that any suit 
that names a state agency as a defendant "does not fall within the limited jurisdiction of the 
district court," 769 F.2d at 1086, and is therefore nonremovable - would apply in precisely the 
same way to removal petitions predicated on federal question jurisdiction. 
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In Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer District, 114 the Sixth Circuit ex-
pressly repudiated the holding and reasoning of McKay. In Henry a 
discharged state employee had filed federal and state law claims in 
Kentucky state court against, among others, a Kentucky agency and 
state officers in both their individual and official capacities. After de-
fendants removed the case, 115 the federal district court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment barred the claims against the state agency and 
the named individuals in their official capacities, and it dismissed them 
without prejudice. It then addressed the section 1983 individual ca-
pacity claims on the merits and held that the defendants' qualified im-
munity insulated them from liability. Finally, it remanded the 
pendent state law claims to the state court from which the case had 
been removed. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Eleventh 
Amendment's application to individual claims divested the district 
court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action, thereby rendering 
removal improvident.116 
The Sixth Circuit rejected this contention. It held that the action 
was removable, that the district court could not adjudicate the claims 
against the state defendants, 117 and that the district court properly 
considered the nonbarred claims on the merits. In reaching this con-
clusion, the Henry court implicitly determined that the Eleventh 
Amendment has no bearing on the propriety of removal. 118 Because 
Henry's suit contained a claim arising under federal law - as, by defi-
nition, do all mixed federal question cases - the civil action was re-
movable.119 The Sixth Circuit then framed the question that divided it 
114. 922 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1990). 
115. Although the opinion is silent on the question, the defendants must have invoked 
§ 144l(a). 
116. 922 F.2d at 335. 
117. The court agreed with the plaintiff that the barred claims should have been remanded 
rather than dismissed. 922 F.2d at 337-38. 
118. In response to plaintiff's argument that "the jurisdictional bar of the eleventh 
amendment . . . stripped the district court of jurisdiction, thereby rendering removal [of the 
entire case] improvident," the court concluded "that the eleventh amendment's jurisdictional bar 
did not divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's individual capac-
ity claim." 922 F.2d at 338. Significantly, the court never addressed the argument that the case 
was not properly removed; it only decided that, because the district court does have jurisdiction 
over the nonbarred claims, it need not remand them. 
The conclusion that, strictly speaking, the Eleventh Amendment is irrelevant to the propriety 
of mixed-case removal is bolstered by the opinions of other courts that have dealt with removed 
mixed cases. Panels in both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have remanded individual barred claims 
without even contemplating that the presence of those claims might have rendered removal of the 
action improper. See, e.g., Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1067 (1993); Gwinn Area Community Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840 (6th 
Cir. 1984). 
119. Supplemental state law claims are removable as well. Section 1367(a) of Title 28, grant-
ing supplemental jurisdiction to the federal courts, provides in relevant part: "[I]n any civil 
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supple-
mental jurisdiction over all other claims that ... form part of the same case or controversy." 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. IV 1992). Section 144l{a) provides for removal of "civil action[s] ... of 
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from the Fifth Circuit in simple terms: Does the Eleventh 
Amendment merely bar individual claims against the state or does it 
foreclose federal jurisdiction over the entirety of cases that include 
such claims? 
The Fifth Circuit's McKay opinion, although somewhat opaque, 
appears to base its holding that mixed cases are not removable on its 
belief that the Eleventh Amendment applies to cases, not claims. Cit-
ing Pennhurst, the court asserted that the Amendment bars cases: 
"The eleventh amendment denies courts of the United States jurisdic-
tion over any action wherein a state or a state agency or department is 
named as defendant."120 Within five years of the Fifth Circuit's opin-
ion, three district courts in the Ninth Circuit, two citing McKay, like-
wise held that any case containing a claim barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment is not removable. Most significantly, McKay's Ninth 
Circuit progeny appear to adopt the same fuzzy reasoning. Acknowl-
edging that removal jurisdiction follows original jurisdiction, they 
merely assert that the presence of a claim against the state bars the 
exercise of original jurisdiction over the entire case. 121 
Reading McKay in this way, the Sixth Circuit in Henry fortified its 
conclusion that mixed cases are removable simply by demonstrating 
that McKay was wrong under settled law. The Henry court first ob-
served that the Supreme Court, in Alabama v. Pugh, 122 had dismissed 
claims brought against a state and its officials in their official capaci-
which the district courts ... have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988). Thus, in 
establishing that a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action that contains supple· 
mental claims, § 1367 ensures that such an action is removable. See also H.R. REP. No. 734, 
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990) (expressing congressional intent that civil actions containing 
supplemental claims would be removable). 
120. 769 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)) (emphasis added). 
121. Unfortunately, the conclusory nature of these opinions precludes a confident under· 
standing of the courts' logic. Two cases arose when private individuals sued the states of Nevada 
and California, and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), in Nevada state court, alleg-
ing, inter alia, that the TRP A's zoning regulations constituted a taking for which the plaintiffs 
were entitled to compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In both cases, 
defendants removed and plaintiffs moved to remand. In Stephans v. Nevada, 685 F. Supp. 217 
(D. Nev. 1988), the court declared that "[p]ursuant to the Eleventh Amendment .•• this Court is 
without jurisdiction over the present case as long as the State of Nevada is a defendant." 685 F. 
Supp. at 219. Nonetheless, the court did allow removal and heard the nonbarred claims after 
employing the doctrine offraudulentjoinder to dismiss the state as a defendant. 685 F. Supp. at 
219-20. Denying removability in Kelly v. California, 687 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Nev. 1988), ajfd., 
880 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1989), the court asserted as a basic principle that "[i]f the action in the 
state court is against parties with respect to whom the federal court cannot exercise jurisdiction, 
the action is not removable." 687 F. Supp. at 1495. 
In Simmons v. California, 740 F. Supp. 781, 785 (E.D. Cal. 1990), a civil rights action similar 
to Henry, the court announced that "it is clear that, at least in the absence of a waiver, a federal 
court does not have the power to entertain suits governed by the provisions of the Eleventh 
Amendment." It proceeded to affirm the conclusion in McKay that "[b]ecause a state agency is a 
defendant, the eleventh amendment bars the exercise of federal jurisdiction here." 740 F. Supp. 
at 785 (citing McKay, 769 F.2d at 1086). 
122. 438 U.S. 781 (1978). 
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ties, while upholding federal court judgments against those same offi-
cials in their individual capacities.123 The Sixth Circuit then recited 
Pennhurst's articulation of settled law: "'A federal court must ex-
amine each claim in a case to see if the court's jurisdiction over that 
claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.' " 124 Concluding that 
"both the Supreme Court and the United States courts of appeals have 
addressed the merits of claims unaffected by the eleventh amendment 
despite the presence of barred claims,"125 Henry explicitly rejected 
McKay's holding that mixed cases are not removable. 126 
Henry is surely correct that, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, 
"the eleventh amendment apparently presents a jurisdictional bar to 
claims, not to entire cases which involve claims implicating the elev-
enth amendment."127 It is tempting therefore to adopt the Sixth 
Circuit's own characterization of the split between itself and the Fifth 
Circuit, repudiating McKay on account of its mistaken reading of the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Pennhurst. 128 While the McKay opinion 
on its face warrants such a criticism, the conclusion that four federal 
courts simply misread nearly crystalline Supreme Court precedent in-
vites skepticism.129 Accordingly, the remainder of this section pieces 
together elements of the four opinions that found mixed cases nonre-
movable in an effort to construct a better argument for that holding. 130 
The most striking feature of the McKay opinion - other than its 
123. Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1990). 
124. 922 F.2d at 337 (quoting Pennhurst IL ~65 U.S. at 121) (emphasis in Henry). 
125. 922 F.2d at 338. 
126. "To the extent that McKay forecloses consideration of claims unaffected by the eleventh 
amendment in favor of remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), we reject its analysis as funda· 
mentally incompatible with Pugh and Pennhurst IL" 922 F.2d at 339. 
127. 922 F.2d at 337. 
128. Superficially, the argument in McKay would actually seem more plausible had the court 
invoked the text of the Eleventh Amendment rather than Pennhurst as authority for the proposi-
tion that "the eleventh amendment denies courts of the United States jurisdiction over any action 
wherein a state ... is named as a defendant." 769 F.2d at 1086; see also supra note 120 and 
accompanying text. In other words, the Fifth Circuit could have argued that Pennhurst and its 
predecessors are wrong: if a plaintiff files suit in federal court and any single claim is barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment, the federal courts are barred from hearing the entire case. This argu-
ment also must fail. 
Although by its express language, the Eleventh Amendment bar encompasses "any suit in 
law or equity," U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added), it is rather late in the day for an . 
argument for faithful adherence to the Eleventh Amendment text. See supra note 4. Moreover, 
the contours of a "suit" have evolved markedly during the two centuries since the Eleventh 
Amendment's adoption. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50. 
129. In cases where the plaintiff originally files a mixed case in federal court, courts seem to 
have no trouble recognizing that the Eleventh Amendment operates only against individual 
claims. See, e.g., Davis v. Department of Soc. Servs., 941 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir.) (opinion at No. 
90-1864, 1991 WL 157258 (Aug. 19, 1991)); Mosley v. Hairston, 920 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1990). 
130. The implication is not that the argument that follows is "really" what the courts in 
question intended. The two important points are, first, that the opinions are so muddled that it is 
unclear just what the courts did intend and, second, that the opinions do contain at least the 
kernel of an argument that is worth considering. 
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apparent misreading of Pennhurst - is that it fails to distinguish be-
tween the absence of subject matter jurisdiction and a bar to the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction.131 A court may have "original jurisdiction" 
pursuant to section 1331, yet any one of a number of factors may pre-
vent the court from deciding the case - for example, the statute of 
limitations, failure to exhaust state or administrative remedies, or the 
Eleventh Amendment. In such event, the court lacks "jurisdiction" in 
the sense of adjudicative power.132 The approach employed by the 
Henry court supports a sharp analytical distinction between the ques-
tion of whether the action is removable and the scope of the Eleventh 
Amendment bar. In contrast, the McKay court intermingled the two 
inquiries. It suggested that removal is permissible only if the district 
court would ultimately have power to adjudicate the action. 133 After 
determining that a claim was barred, the court concluded that it could 
not adjudicate the entire mixed case.134 Because the purpose of sec-
tion 144l(a)- in contradistinction to section 144l(c)- is to remove 
entire actions, the court held the case nonremovable. t3s Schemati-
cally, then, the reasoning of the McKay line of cases can be parsed as 
follows: (1) a civil action is removable only if it could be heard in 
federal court; (2) if the Eleventh Amendment bars some claims, a fed-
eral district court cannot hear the action in its entirety; (3) section 
1441(a) does not allow removal of parts of cases; therefore (4) the ac-
tion is nonremovable. 136 
131. In rapid succession, the opinion states both that the case "does not fall within the lim-
ited jurisdiction of the district court" and that "the eleventh amendment bars the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction" over the case. 769 F.2d at 1086. 
132. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 85 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
133. The clear import of the McKay court's observation that § 1441 "only authorizes the 
removal of actions that are within the original jurisdiction of the district court," 769 F.2d at 
1086, is that the presence of a barred claim forecloses original jurisdiction. The use of the phrase 
"original jurisdiction" is misleading. Consistent with the analysis proposed in this Note, this 
phrase should be understood in context not as a reference to the "original jurisdiction statutes," 
§§ 1331-1332, but rather to the bottom-line determination of whether the federal district courts 
would have power to adjudicate the entire civil action had it been originally filed there by the 
plaintiff. 
134. 769 F.2d at 1087. 
135. At least one of the district courts was surely reasoning along these lines: 
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1441 does not define the phrase "civil action," common sense suggests 
it is the action which was filed in the state court .... [T]he phrase "civil action" in the 
statute "denotes the entirety of the proceedings in question, not merely" claims or par-
ties .... [T)he removal statute does not countenance the removal of bits and pieces of cases. 
Simmons v. California, 740 F. Supp. 781, 785-86 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (quoting Arango v. Guzman 
Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1376 (5th Cir. 1980)). In this regard,§ 144l(a) stands in 
revealing contrast to particular removal grants in addition to § 1441(c). See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1452(a) (1988) (authorizing removal to the district courts of "any claim or cause of action in a 
civil action" if such claim or cause of action relates to bankruptcy). 
136. This second reading of McKay possesses an obvious virtue. If the term "original juris· 
diction" has a different meaning in§ 144l(a) than it does in§ 1331, McKay could be reconciled 
with those cases originally filed in federal court in which the district court properly applied the 
Eleventh Amendment to dismiss particular claims while adjudicating nonbarred claims on the 
merits. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text; supra note 129. 
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There are two problems with this reasoning, for neither step (1) 
nor step (3) can withstand scrutiny.137 The greater objection lies 
against the first step: there is simply no warrant for reading the re-
moval statute to direct the district court to resolve all jurisdictional 
questions before it grants removal. By its express terms, section 1441 
conditions removal upon the district court's "original jurisdiction," 
leading the Supreme Court and commentators to assume that section 
1441 serves only to direct the inquiry to the particular original juris-
diction statutes.138 Moreover, there are practical reasons for preserv-
ing the distinction between lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a 
bar to the exercise of that jurisdiction. Most notably, a state defendant 
can waive the Eleventh Amendment bar, 139 whereas parties cannot 
waive the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.140 Accordingly, a 
heavy burden rests on courts and litigants who would wish to read 
"original" out of section 1441(a).141 
Rote invocation of the maxim that courts should construe the re-
moval statutes narrowly to comport with congressional intent to limit 
removal142 will not suffice. No evidence suggests that Congress in-
137. Lest the reader suspect that the reconstituted argument for McKay is a weakly con-
trived strawman, it should be noted that similar arguments have been advanced by other liti-
gants. For example, an amicus curiae brief filed by 18 states in Carnegie-Mellon University v. 
Cohill argued that when a federal question claim is joined to a pendent state law claim, neither is 
removable under § 144l(a). See Joan Steinman, Removal, Remand, and Review in Pendent 
Claim and Pendent Party Cases, 41 VAND. L. REV. 923, 932 (1988) (citing Amicus Curiae Brief 
of States of Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, 
and Wisconsin in Support of Respondents at 4-16, Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 
(1988) (No. 86-1021)). 
Amici reasoned that § 144l(c) alone affords defendants the right to remove cases involving 
both removable and nonremovable claims. If the two claims are not "separate and independent" 
- and pendent claims, by definition, are not - there is no statutory basis for removal. Worse, to 
allow removal would effectively nullify§ 144l(c). This argument is even less tenable than would 
be the comparable argument against mixed-case removal because, under the doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction, the entire case in Carnegie-Mellon was within the federal courts' jurisdiction. Con-
sequently, the Court held the case removable, as "both the Court's majority and the dissenters 
responded to the arguments of the amicus curiae with a deafening silence." Steinman, supra, at 
938. 
138. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. l, 8 (1983) 
("[P]ropriety of removal turns on whether the case falls within the original 'federal question' 
jurisdiction of the United States district courts."); Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 
U.S. 699, 702 (1972); see also Steinman, supra note 137, at 928 n.29. 
139. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). 
140. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n.21 (1978); 
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951). 
141. It is not reasonable to assume that§ 144l(a) uses the word jurisdiction in the sense of 
"power to adjudicate" and employs the qualifier "original" merely in contrast to "appellate." 
The statute speaks only of the federal district courts, which do not exercise appellate jurisdiction. 
142. See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941). Although 
federal courts repeat this maxim frequently, see, e.g., Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., 932 F.2d 
1043, 1045-46 (2d Cir. 1991); York v. Horizon Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 712 F. Supp. 85, 87 
(E.D. La. 1989); Dorfman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 496, 501 (E.D. Pa. 1985), 
the proper scope of its application is narrow. Cf Steinman, supra note 137, at 936 ("This pre-
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tended to enable plaintiffs to foreclose federal question removal merely 
by joining a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment. On the con-
trary, a district court should read section 1441(a) as its plain meaning 
warrants and grant removal of a mixed case if it lies within the district 
courts' original jurisdiction. 
Even if section 144l(a) were read to condition removal upon a dis-
trict court's determination that it could exercise its adjudicatory 
power unimpeded, step (3) in the McKay reasoning could not be main-
tained. Common sense and the recent turbulent history of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction suggest that, in unusual circumstances, section 1441(a) 
does allow removal of parts of cases. A revealing analogue arises from 
the treatment of pendent party removal by the circuits that, prior to 
Congress's enactment of section 1367, construed the statutory regime 
to preclude pendent party jurisdiction. 
As Professor Joan Steinman has recounted, 143 both a panel of the 
First Circuit144 and a district court within the Ninth Circuit145 ex-
pressly considered whether they were obligated to remand the entire 
removed case on the grounds that original jurisdiction does not em-
brace civil actions containing pendent party claims. Unlike in 
Carnegie-Mellon, the federal courts could not permit removal of the 
entire civil action. 146 Therefore, the argument for holding the case 
nonremovable and remanding all claims seemed strong: "Arguably, 
just as no partial removals are authorized, no partial remands - cre-
ating the same results - should be permitted."147 
In contrast to the reconstituted reasoning of McKay, both the First 
Circuit and the district court bowed to countervailing policy consider-
ations - principally that plaintiffs not be able to use permissive join-
der rules to foreclose defendants' right to remove federal question 
claims - in choosing to remand only the pendent party claims and 
hear the federal question claims. 148 Even Steinman, an avowed strict 
interpreter of the removal statute, 149 supports these results, reiterating 
scription ... is really just a corollary of the doctrine that federal courts always ought to narrowly 
construe their subject matter jurisdiction."). Shamrock Oil advises that federal courts should err 
against finding federal jurisdiction when applying established doctrine to removed cases; it 
should not be read as authorizing courts to craft new rules in the removal context for determin-
ing whether a jurisdictional provision is satisfied. 
143. Steinman, supra note 137, at 979-82. 
144. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 936 (1983). 
145. Adolph Coors Co. v. Sickler, 608 F. Supp. 1417 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
146. Contrast the argument by Carnegie-Mellon amicus curiae as outlined by Steinman, 
supra note 137. 
147. Steinman, supra note 137, at 985. 
148. Bonanno. 708 F.2d at 10-11; Coors, 608 F. Supp. at 1426-27. This is the crux of the 
difference between holding that a mixed case is not removable and holding that it is removable 
but that the district court has discretion to return the entire case to the state court. The issue is 
whether plaintiffs or federal judges decide if the private defendants can secure a federal forum. 
149. See infra note 213. 
December 1993] Note - Remand Discretion 709 
the concern that defendants' removal rights not be frustrated and em-
phasizing "Congress' intention to grant removal jurisdiction over the 
same class or universe of cases as falls within original federal 
jurisdiction." 150 
These considerations serve to undermine the third step in the argu-
ment that mixed cases are not removable. Even if a court were to 
apply the Eleventh Amendment before assessing removability, it need 
not conclude that the mixed case is wholly nonremovable. Notwith-
standing that section 1441(a) generally contemplates removal of entire 
cases, such a court should allow removal of the claims over which it 
can exercise jurisdiction. 
In sum, however reconstructed, the reasoning of McKay is unsup-
portable. Henry concluded rightly that defendants may remove mixed 
cases pursuant to section 144l(a) if and only if the case falls within the 
district courts' original jurisdiction. The Eleventh Amendment simply 
does not bear on the initial question of removability. 151 
In our federal system, the national government is supreme over the 
states. Within this hierarchy, the Eleventh Amendment embodies a 
courtesy due to state sovereignty when state - and not national -
interests are particularly affected. If this constitutionalized comity 
were to prevent federal courts from entertaining matters concerning 
federal law and not implicating state sovereignty, the Eleventh 
Amendment "would tum federalism on its head." 152 That is, an 
Amendment designed to accord limited deference to state sovereignty 
would become a vehicle for effectively usurping federal sovereignty. 153 
Rather, the essential step is to determine whether the substance of the 
claims or the citizenship of the parties supports original jurisdiction. 
Because any action that contains a barred claim necessarily fails the 
test for complete diversity, mixed cases are removable only on the ba-
sis of a federal question. The Eleventh Amendment becomes relevant 
only after a section 1441(a) removal has been effected. 
150. Steinman, supra note 137, at 986-87. But see Gibson v. City of Glendale Police Dept., 
786 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. Wis. 1992). 
151. This approach admittedly yields a peculiar situation if the action consists solely of fed-
eral law claims against the state defendants and state law claims against the private defendants. 
The entire action is removable. See supra note 119. However, the Eleventh Amendment bars the 
district court from exercising jurisdiction over any of the federal question claims. The end result 
could then be that the federal court adjudicates the claims arising under state law and the state 
court adjudicates the claims arising under federal law. This theoretic possibility should not be 
too troubling because § 1367 grants the district court discretion to remand the state law claims. 
Presumably, a decision not to remand the claims would constitute abuse of discretion. 
152. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472 (1974). 
153. Cf Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407 (1821) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar Supreme Court review of state court decisions, and reasoning that the 
Amendment could not have been intended to "so chang[e] the relations between the whole and 
its parts, as to strip the [national] government of the means of protecting, by the instrumentality 
of its Courts, the constitution and laws from active violation"). 
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II. DISPOSING OF THE PROPERLY REMOVED MIXED CASE 
Once a district court has determined that a mixed case is properly 
removed it must apply the Eleventh Amendment to the constitutive 
claims. The remainder of this Note considers whether the court 
should and can remand rather than hear the nonbarred claims. A 
question of subordinate intrigue, but analytic priority, is whether the 
court should remand or dismiss without prejudice the claims that it 
cannot entertain.154 
If the only grounds for remand are those specified in section 
1447(c) - lack of subject matter jurisdiction and procedural defect -
then the court must dismiss rather than remand the barred claims. 
The inconvenient and dilatory consequence of such a rule is that a 
plaintiff who files a mixed case in state court must, after defendants 
remove the action and the federal court dismisses the claims against 
the state, refile those claims in the very court whose jurisdiction she 
initially invoked. Worse, in states without a savings statute, the plain-
tiff risks losing her barred claims to the statute of limitations. 155 Sensi-
bly, the Sixth Circuit in Henry, while failing even to consider the 
wisdom or possibility of remanding the nonbarred claims, did order 
the district court to remand rather than dismiss the claims that the 
Eleventh Amendment prevented it from adjudicating. 156 This ruling 
was consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Lower courts generally 
read Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill 151 to establish that the dis-
trict courts' authority to remand removed claims is coterminous with 
their power to dismiss claims originally filed in federal court. 158 
Recognition that the district court should remand the barred 
claims of a removed mixed case crystallizes the fact that if the district 
court proceeds with the nonbarred claims it does so at the likely ex-
pense of a bifurcated cause of action. To determine whether the trade-
off is systemically desirable, this Part examines the relevant policy 
considerations that would favor either maintaining a single suit in 
state court or bifurcating the case to exercise federal jurisdiction over 
the nonbarred claims. Section II.A observes that the provision of fed-
eral question jurisdiction rests upon Congress's assumption that fed-
154. This preliminary question would be avoided in the unlikely event that a court were 
partially to follow the reconstituted reasoning of McKay, holding that only the nonbarred claims 
are removable. See supra text accompanying notes 143-51. 
155. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046, 1053 (3d 
Cir.) (Stapleton, J., dissenting) ("Removed cases frequently remain pending in the federal court 
well past the limitations deadline."), vacated, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1163 (3d Cir. 
1986), affd., 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
156. Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 337-38 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Gwinn 
Area Community Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Behre v. United 
States, 659 F. Supp. 747, 751 (D.N.H. 1987) (remanding rather than dismissing barred claims). 
157. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
158. See infra section III.B.2. 
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eral judges will interpret and apply federal law more faithfully than 
will their state counterparts. Section II.B proposes that the major con-
siderations favoring remand are the pragmatic and equitable ones of 
judicial economy and fairness to the parties. Because the weight of 
these incommensurable factors will vary from case to case, this Part 
concludes that only exercise of district court remand discretion can 
effectively balance the competing interests. 159 
A. Reasons To Exercise Federal Jurisdiction 
The Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] 
the Laws of the United States,"160 but leaves it to Congress to establish 
both the lower courts161 and their jurisdiction.162 In the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 Congress did create lower courts and assigned them original 
diversity jurisdiction.163 While it may seem intuitive that federal 
courts should be empowered to hear cases involving federal law, 
Congress did not authorize original federal question jurisdiction until 
after the Civil War. 164 The rationale at the time was that southern 
state courts would not protect new federal rights. 165 Today, one 
would expect that original federal question jurisdiction must be justi-
fied upon different grounds. 
Scholars generally agree that original jurisdiction is valuable to the 
extent that federal courts are more likely than state courts to render 
the "better" verdict. 166 The supposed superiority of federal courts 
159. The discussion that follows assumes that the state defendant is not an indispensable 
party, within the meaning of FED. R. C1v. P. 19, to the dispute between the plaintiff and the 
private defendants. If a district court determines that the presence of a party over whom it 
cannot exercise jurisdiction is essential to the just resolution of the claims before it, it should 
dismiss - or, in this situation, remand - the action without prejudice. See, e.g., Ainsworth 
Aristocrat Intl. Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism Co., 818 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 1987) {apparently agree-
ing with the district court that if a state defendant is an indispensable party, the entire action 
must be dismissed); Lovell v. One Bancorp, 690 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 (D. Me. 1988). 
160. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I. 
161. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. 
162. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
163. Ch. 20, §§ 2-4, 11, 1 Stat. 73-75, 78 (1789). 
164. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470. Actually, federal question juris-
diction had existed once before. As part of the Federalists' attempt to retain control of the 
federal judiciary in the lame-duck days of the Adams administration, Congress granted original 
and removal federal question jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1801. Ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92. 
It was repealed the following year. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. 
165. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 & n.28 (1972); REDISH, supra note 
34, at 2. Tocqueville anticipated the need for original federal question jurisdiction decades ear-
lier. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 140 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George 
Lawrence trans., 1969) ("[E]ach state is not only foreign to the Union at large but is its perpetual 
adversary, since whatever authority the Union loses turns to the advantage of the states. Thus, 
to make the state courts enforce the laws of the Union would be handing the nation over to 
judges who are prejudiced as well as foreign."). 
166. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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rests upon four common explanations.167 Federal judges are consid-
ered: (1) more competent than state judges; (2) more expert in, and 
accustomed to, federal law; (3) less susceptible to political pressures 
and correspondingly more sympathetic to federal rights and inter-
ests; 168 and (4) more likely to produce a uniform and coherent body of 
federal law .169 The validity of these assumptions is much debated. 170 
The relevant point, however, is that the worth of original federal ques-
tion jurisdiction is measured in terms relatively amenable to balancing 
through district court remand discretion. A district court's exercise of 
its jurisdiction over federal questions has value precisely to the extent 
that it would likely render a more accurate171 verdict than would the 
state court. 172 
B. Reasons To Retain All Claims in State Court 
While the rationales for hearing the nonbarred claims in federal 
court focus on the forum, the arguments for remand of all claims have 
nothing to do with the virtue of state courts per se. The argument in 
favor of remand focuses on the value of maintaining a single suit. This 
section argues that two major factors favor a single suit: judicial econ-
omy and fairness to the plaintiff. Every instance of mixed-case re-
moval implicates these considerations to a greater or lesser degree. 173 
317, 328 (1978) ("All grants of federal jurisdiction are based upon some perceived inadequacy of 
state courts."). 
167. See REDISH, supra note 34, at 1·2. 
168. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 
13 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRODS. 216, 234 (1948) ("[T]he reason for providing the initial federal 
forum is the fear that state courts will view the federal right ungenerously."), 
169. See, e.g .. ALI STUDY DRAFT No. 5, supra note 75, at 165-66. Uniformity is a consider· 
ation of a different order than are the other three for it focuses not on the likelihood that a federal 
judge's interpretation of law will be more correct but on the value of consistency per se. The 
importance of uniformity was a compelling argument for the supremacy of U.S. Supreme Court 
interpretations of law. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816). 
Given the virtual unavailability of Supreme Court review of state court decisions, it is also a 
powerful factor supporting availability of an initial federal forum. 
170. Compare Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (asserting 
the superiority offederal courts) with Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional 
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981) (suggesting independent value of state court 
constitutional litigation) and Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation 
in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
213 (1983) (purporting to demonstrate that state courts are as likely as are federal courts to 
vindicate constitutional rights). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: 
Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988) (criticizing Solimine and 
Walker's study, and arguing that parity is an unmeasurable empirical question). 
171. "Accuracy" or "correctness" can be measured either conventionally, in terms of con-
formity to Supreme Court interpretation, see, e.g .. Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" i11 
the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 159 & n.13 (1953), or in an objectivist sense, in 
terms of fidelity to the genuine dictates of the Constitution and federal statutes. 
172. See Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics-A Half Measure of Authority for 
Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 785 ("[E]ven ifthese assumptions do not 
reflect reality, they do underpin federal question jurisdiction."). 
173. The following discussion should not be understood to suggest that judicial economy and 
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The principal reason for preferring a single suit is pragmatic: sim-
ply put, one lawsuit is better than two. It is intuitively sensible, and a 
fundamental axiom of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that a 
single wrong be tried in a single action.174 Equally important, consoli-
dated litigation is less expensive and more efficient, both for the court 
systems taken together175 and for the parties. Commentators have in-
creasingly recognized the importance of promoting efficient judicial 
administration. 176 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has announced nu-
merous doctrines crafted explicitly to advance judicial economy in 
such diverse areas as habeas corpus,177 abstention, 178 and the in-
fairness are necessarily the only relevant factors weighing against bifurcation. Other factors may 
be implicated in particular cases. For example, consistent with the principle that courts should 
dispose of cases so as to avoid passing on constitutional questions whenever possible, see 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Vailey Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), 
the presence of both constitutional and nonconstitutional issues would be an additional consider-
ation favoring preservation of the entire case in a single proceeding. See Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 118-21 (1984); 465 U.S. at 159-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 1202 (3d ed. 1988) (observing that Pennhurst's holding that the Eleventh Amendment 
bars all state law claims against states "may deprive the federal court of the chance to avoid a 
constitutional decision"). 
174. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 249 (noting a "central tenet of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
the unit of litigation should be the transaction as it occurred in the world"). 
175. Reducing inefficiency in the courts is of particular urgency given today's weII-docu-
mented "litigation explosion" and the consequently overcrowded dockets. See, e.g., JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 3-10 (1990) 
[hereinafter STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT]; HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A 
GENERAL VIEW 15-54 (1973); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND 
REFORM 59-102 (1985); William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Fed-
eral Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1. But see Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, 
the Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 921; Marc Galanter, Reading the 
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our 
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). 
176. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 5.4.1, at 276 ("Judicial economy is served by 
having a matter litigated in one court rather than in two or more tribunals. The splitting of 
lawsuits increases costs to the parties, wastes social resources, and risks inconsistent verdicts 
from the different courts."); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT: 
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT 9 (1993) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT] ("Repeated 
relitigation of the common issues in a complex case unduly expends the resources of attorney and 
client, burdens already overcrowded dockets, delays recompense for those in need ... and con--
tributes to the negative image many people have of the legal system."). Cost has been a first-
order concern in our procedural system at least since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
revamped in 1938 with the explicit recognition that "[t]hey shaII be construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. C1v. P. 1. 
177. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (adopting a "cause" and "prejudice" 
test for excusing procedural defaults in lieu of the "deliberate bypass" standard of Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391 (1963)); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991) (applying the Wainwright 
test to successive habeas petitions); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982) (requiring dis-
missal of a petition containing both exhausted and nonexhausted claims); see also Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (prefiguring Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465 (1976), in urging that search and seizure claims not be cognizable on habeas). 
178. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 13-16 
(1983); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-20 (1976) 
(approving stay or dismissal because of concurrent state proceedings). Whether the Colorado 
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dependent and adequate state grounds doctrine. 179 Congress, too, has 
devoted sustained attention in recent years to the problem of litigation 
expense and delay.180 
Equitable considerations provide the other chief reason to prefer 
remand of all claims. Ordinarily, a plaintiff can both package her 
claims as she wishes and choose a federal forum on suits containing 
federal questions. In the mixed-case removal scenario, the plaintiff has 
voluntarily forgone her right to litigate her nonbarred federal claims in 
federal court by originally filing suit in state court. 181 To allow re-
moval to bifurcate that suit would present a plaintiff with an unsettling 
dilemma: she could either assume the expense, inconvenience, and in-
creased risk of litigating on two fronts 182 or drop the claims in one of 
the forums. Regardless of the plaintiff's ultimate decision, by forcing 
her to confront a Hobson's choice - to drop potentially valid causes 
of action or to assume the burden of litigating two suits - mixed-case 
removal magnifies the unfairness that the Eleventh Amendment itself 
works upon plaintiffs183 who have the ill fortune to allege that the state 
River doctrine is technically a species of abstention has occasioned some debate, the resolution of 
which is inconsequential. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 34, at 298. 
179. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1983) (rejecting in dicta, for reasons of 
judicial efficiency, certification of questions to state court). 
180. See H.R. REP No. 734, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6862 ("Congress has long been concerned with court congestion and workload, and has passed 
legislation to relieve caseload pressures in virtually every Congress in recent memory •••. "), 
181. Concededly, a given plaintiff might contrive a cause of action against the state for the 
sole purpose of clouding the defendant's right to removal. In such a case, the district court could 
employ the doctrine of fraudulent joinder to dismiss the claims against the state, thereby creating 
a single suit of nonbarred claims. See, e.g., See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545 (Sth 
Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981). Moreover, ifthe district court believes that the claims against the state 
are untenable, even if not utterly contrived, it could simply exercise its discretion by retaining 
jurisdiction over the nonbarred claims. Cf. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 
(1988) ("A district court can consider whether the plaintiff has engaged in any manipulative 
tactics when it decides whether to remand a case."). 
182. Splitting one's suit increases risk in two ways. First is the risk of incommensurable 
outcomes: both courts find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, but each concludes that the 
defendant in the other action is the only party liable; the plaintiff would have recovered had 
either court adjudicated the entire suit. See John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the 
Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735, 762 (1991). 
Second is the asymmetrical risk of collateral estoppel. A plaintiff will be precluded from 
relitigating in the second suit any common issues decided against her in the first suit to judgment. 
See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980). But, due to lack of privily between the 
state and private defendants, she will likely be unable to use collateral estoppel as a sword to bar 
relitigation of issues decided in her favor. See STUDY COMMITTEE PAPERS, supra note 93, at 
557. For an exception in which the state might suffer from issue preclusion, see Duncan v. 
United States, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (individual and official capacity claims in which state 
was involved in defense of the former). Presumably the plaintiff will not suffer claim preclusion 
under Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), because she cannot be 
faulted for failing to litigate all claims in one suit. 
183. Mixed-case removal might also have disproportionate effects upon particular classes of 
people, given the likely nonrandom distribution of persons who will be plaintiffs and defendants 
in mixed cases. Cf. Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 1057, 1084-92 (arguing that removal of§ 1983 actions should be prohibited). 
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wronged them. 184 This "fairness factor" assumes added significance 
given the very real prospect that the defendants' principal purpose in 
removing the mixed case might be to impose just this dilemma upon 
the plaintiff. 185 
In light of these competing interests, it is unreasonable to conclude 
that the district court should either always hear or always remand the 
nonbarred claims. To be sure, reasonable persons will value the two 
sets of relevant considerations differently. Because the magnitude of 
the respective interests varies with the contingencies of any given case, 
however, all observers should agree that at some point or another the 
balance shifts. 186 In general, if the nonbarred claims present novel or 
184. Remanding the whole case to state court would work no comparable "unfairness" upon 
defendants. The preceding section takes into account the defendants' legitimate interest in secur-
ing a federal forum: the federal courts' marginal superiority as interpreters of federal law. To 
term the denial of that forum "unfair" would be double counting. 
185. That defendants are sometimes motivated to remove actions for tactical reasons uncon-
nected to an interest in litigating in a federal forum is well recognized. For example, then-Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent from the Thermtron Court's construction of an exception to§ 1447(d)'s pro-
hibition on review of remand orders emphasized the danger of providing defendants with an 
additional weapon in their arsenal of delaying tactics. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 
423 U.S. 336, 354-55 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also ALI STUDY DRAFT No. 5, supra 
note 75, at 91 (commentary to § 1312) (the majority of removals are "probably dictated by 
purely tactical considerations"). Such tactical behavior should be particularly unacceptable if 
engineered by the state defendant because it has the power - through waiver of its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity - to eliminate the plaintiff's postremoval dilemma. 
The relevance of the motives animating the defendants' choice to remove, like those underly-
ing the plaintiff's joinder decision, is another good reason to empower district courts with re-
mand discretion. Cf. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from 
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 663 (1971) ("The final reason - and probably the most 
pointed and helpful one - for bestowing discretion on the trial judge as to many matters is, 
paradoxically, the superiority of his nether position. It is not that he knows more than his loftier 
brothers; rather, he sees more and senses more."). 
186. A balancing approach is warranted so long as neither of the competing sets of interests 
constitutes a statutory or constitutional trump. Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
465 U.S. 89 (1984): 
Respondents urge that ... "considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to 
litigants" .•. counsel against a result that may cause litigants to split causes of action 
between state and federal courts .... [T]he answer to respondents' assertions is that such 
considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the 
federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State. 
465 U.S. at 121-23 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); other 
citations omitted); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978) (acknowl-
edging the significance of "convenience of litigants ... [and] judicial economy" but holding that 
to allow ancillary jurisdiction "would simply flout the congressional command"). Part IV of this 
Note argues that the removal statutes permit remand of the nonbarred claims. Were courts to 
reject that argument, Congress can and should amend § 1447(c) to permit such discretionary 
remand. 
On a related note, the non binary, nonquantifiable nature of these considerations militates 
against a legislative solution to the dilemma of how to dispose of the properly removed mixed 
case. Recognizing that the federal interests favoring remand of the nonbarred claims will some-
times outweigh those underlying their submission to federal jurisdiction, an opponent of judicial 
discretion might suggest that Congress expressly reject remand discretion while defining with 
greater specificity the particular circumstances in which the district court must remand the non-
barred claims. The multiplicity and varying weights of factors that would deserve consideration 
in an ideal jurisdictional allocation, however, pose a very significant limit to the value of even the 
most perfect legislative rule. Cf. Wechsler, supra note 168: 
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complex questions of federal law, the district court should likely hear 
them even at the expense of a bifurcated suit. On the other hand, if 
the federal questions presented are routine, and if the plaintiff's claims 
against the state defendants appear well founded, the district court 
probably should choose to remand. 187 The majority of cases are likely 
to fall within these two extremes. In sum, a district court empowered 
with remand discretion would properly remand some mixed cases in 
their entirety and entertain the nonbarred components of others. 188 
Ill. REMAND DISCRETION AND THE SUPREME COURT 
The conclusion that policy considerations would often advise a dis-
trict court to remand nonbarred claims provokes the question whether 
the district courts actually enjoy legal authority to exercise such re-
mand discretion. The inquiry begins with the governing statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c). Section 1447(c) mandates that the district courts 
remand a case for either a "defect in removal procedure" or lack of 
"subject matter jurisdiction."189 Because neither of these bases would 
No fonnulae for jurisdiction can reflect with full resiliency the complicated values of our 
federalism. There is no perfect separation between factors that are relevant to jurisdiction 
and those that should have bearing only on the manner of its exercise. However well de· 
vised the general standards, correctives will be needed in particular situations that are not 
readily articulated in a statutory rule. 
Id. at 218. 
187. Cf. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting) ("When state and federal courts are barely able to handle their burgeoning 
caseloads, and there are frequent and justified complaints about the cost and delay of litigation, 
the court should be reluctant to fashion a rule that wilt cause such wholesale duplication of 
effort."), cert. granted, 488 U.S. 816, cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 986 (1988). In the 1988 Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Congress vindicated Judge Kozinski's criticisms by 
amending§ 144l(a) to ensure that the presence of Doe defendants could not delay removal. Pub. 
L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669. 
188. There are reasons to believe that the courts that found mixed cases nonremovable were, 
consciously or not, exercising pseudoremand discretion in the guise of objective determinations 
regarding removal jurisdiction. First, the possible arguments for nonremovability of mixed cases 
are really quite weak. Second, the opinions are shamelessly conclusory. Most significantly, two 
of the opinions expressed a decided aversion to the hypertechnical application of procedural 
rules. See Simmons v. California, 740 F. Supp. 781, 785 (E.D. Cal. 1990) ("[A]lthough the 
private defendants' argument is premised on an abstractly accurate description of the pleadings, 
the conclusions they draw cannot stand."); Kelly v. California, 687 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Nev. 
1988), affd., 880 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1989): 
During my twenty-five years as a federal judge I have been impressed by the fact that in civil 
litigation approximately fifty percent of my time has been devoted to attempting to solve 
intricate, difficult, perplexing, thorny, and frequently imponderable issues of federal jurisdic· 
tion. In my view this is one of the great deficiencies of the federal judicial system. An 
inordinate amount of lawyer and judicial effort must be spent on trying to establish that the 
court has authority to do what one or both of the parties want it to do rather than on the 
merits of the litigation. 
687 F. Supp. at 1495. 
189. 
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be 
made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section l 446(a). If at any 
time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 
the case shall be remanded. 
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justify remand of the nonbarred federal question claims in a properly 
removed mixed case, the essential question is whether these two 
grounds are exclusive. The answer hinges on whether the statute is 
construed to mean: (1) a district court shall remand for either of the 
two grounds, and shall not remand otherwise; or (2) the court shall 
remand for either of these two grounds, and may remand otherwise. 
This Note terms these constructions the prohibitory and permissive in-
terpretations, respectively. 190 Although commentators have long as-
sumed uncritically that district courts may not remand claims that fall 
within their subject matter jurisdiction,191 the language of section 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988). 
Although the language does not make this clear, remand for procedural defect is obligatory. 
Prior to amendment in 1988, § 1447(c) read in pertinent part: "If at any time before final judg-
ment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district 
court shall remand the case .... " See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). Congress intended the 
amendment only to establish a time limit for plaintiffs to object to a removal defect. See WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 34, § 3739. The House Report expresses no intention to lessen the district 
courts' obligation to remand for procedural defect so long as the plaintiff's motion for remand is 
timely. See H.R. REP. No. 889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5982, 6033. Because courts had uniformly read the phrase "improvidently and without jurisdic-
tion" disjunctively to refer to either procedural defect or Jack of jurisdiction, see FDIC v. Alley, 
820 F.2d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 1987); Robert T. Markowski, Note, Remand Order Review After 
Thermtron Products, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1086, 1092-93, and because " 'it will not be inferred that 
Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect, unless such 
intention is clearly expressed,'" Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989) (quoting An-
derson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 199 (1912)), there is no difference, for purposes of 
this Note, between the present form of§ 1447(c) and the version in effect when the Supreme 
Court decided Thermtron and Carnegie-Mellon. 
190. The permissive reading holds not that§ 1447(c) confers unbridled discretion upon dis-
trict judges, but only that Congress intended to vest district courts with some undefined residue 
of discretion to remand for reasons beyond those specified. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction 
and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (1985) ("[I]n some instances the primary purpose of 
conferring a power to choose is to foster the development of rules for the finer tuning of general 
jurisdictional grants. Only rarely are courts given unlimited power to make continuing, ad hoc 
choices."). For a more general discussion of the various uses of the term discretion, see RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-39 (1977). 
191. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 217, 291; WRIGHT, supra note 96, § 41, at 
235. The few commentaries on Thermtron all focus on its treatment of § 1447(d), apparently 
finding its discussion of§ 1447(c) unremarkable. See J. Michael Myers, Federal Appellate Review 
of Remand Orders: Expansion or Eradication?, 48 Miss. L.J. 741, 750-52 (1977); Joseph T. 
Carruthers, Note, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1031 (1976); Tony M. Graham, Recent Develop-
ments, 12 TULSA L.J. 194 (1976); Elizabeth S. Kelly, Casenote, 1976 S. ILL U. L.J. 541; C. Lee, 
Casenote, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 521 (1977); Markowski, Note, supra note 189; Paul V. Mueth-
ing, Recent Case, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 288 (1976); Stephen V. Rible, Comment, Federal Courts: 
Review of the Remand Order, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 274 (1977). Carruthers alone flagged the issue: 
While the statute does not specify that remand is possible only under such conditions, it may 
be assumed that Congress intended the stated grounds for remand to be exclusive. Indeed, 
no case suggests that a district court is vested with discretion in remand decisions while 
several assert that no such discretionary power exists. 
Carruthers, supra, at 1033-34. This passage contains two footnotes. The first supports the au-
thor's assumption regarding congressional intent with an indirect reference to the canon of statu-
tory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one excludes others). 
Id. at 1033 n.19. On the inapplicability of this canon, see infra note 244. The second notes 
rightly: "None of the cases, however, offered any reasons or cited any authority to support their 
opinions." Id. at 1034 n.20. 
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1447(c) supports either interpretation. 192 
This Part examines the Supreme Court's treatment of the ambigu-
ous remand provision. Section III.A discusses the Court's 1976 deci-
sion in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer. 193 This section 
identifies and questions the widely held view that the Thermtron 
Products Court affirmed the prohibitory construction of section 
1447(c). Section IIl.B investigates the Court's most recent pronounce-
ment on section 1447(c), its 1988 decision in Carnegie-Mellon Univer-
sity v. Cohill 194 In Carnegie-Mellon, the Supreme Court clearly 
established that the express grounds of section 1447(c) do not consti-
tute the exclusive bases for remand. Unfortunately, in rejecting the 
prohibitory reading of section 1447(c), the Court did not clarify what 
may constitute permissible grounds for remand when removal is tech-
nically and jurisdictionally proper. This section argues that, although 
the issue is debatable, the best reading of Carnegie-Mellon allows dis-
cretionary remand in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, 
and fairness. If so, Supreme Court precedent would permit district 
courts to remand the nonbarred claims of removed mixed cases. 
A. Thermtron Products and the Argument Against 
Extrastatutory Remand 
The Supreme Court first addressed section 1447(c)'s inherent am-
biguity in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer. 195 In that case, 
the district court had remanded a personal injury suit, removed pursu-
ant to diversity jurisdiction, on the sole grounds that its overcrowded 
docket would excessively delay a trial. The district judge had rea-
soned that such a delay would violate the plaintiffs' " 'right to a speedy 
decision on the merits of their cause of action.' " 196 The defendants 
petitioned for a writ of mandamus to order the district judge to hear 
the case. The Sixth Circuit denied the petition on the grounds that 
section 1447(d) barred it from reviewing the district court's remand 
order. 197 The Supreme Court entertained the petition. It held that 
section 1447(d) only barred review of remand orders issued pursuant 
to section 1447(c) and that orders to remand based on grounds other 
than those expressly authorized by statute are reviewable. 198 The 
192. See Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1422 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) ("Carnegie-Mel/on responded to the problem that ... nothing in § 1447(c) says that 
'improvidently and without jurisdiction' are the only grounds of remand."). 
193. 423 U.S. 336 (1976). 
194. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
195. 423 U.S. 336 (1976). 
196. 423 U.S. at 340 (quoting Record at 36). 
197. 423 U.S. at 341-42. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1988) reads in relevant part: "An order re-
manding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or 
otherwise .... " 
198. 423 U.S. at 345-46 (Sections 1447(c) and (d) "'are in pari materia [and) nrc to be con-
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Court concluded that "[t]he District Court exceeded its authority in 
remanding on grounds not permitted by the controlling statute."199 It 
added in a footnote: "Lower federal courts have uniformly held that 
cases properly removed from state to federal court within the federal 
court's jurisdiction may not be remanded for discretionary reasons not 
authorized by the controlling statute."200 
Accordingly, most lower courts and commentators understood 
Thermtron to hold that district courts may not remand for any reasons 
beyond those expressly authorized.201 But the Court's holding can be 
read much more narrowly: "[A]n otherwise properly removed action 
may [not] be remanded because the district court considers itself too 
busy to try it .... "202 Such a reading would understand the Court's 
comment that it is "not convinced that Congress ever intended to ex-
tend carte blanche authority to the district courts to . . . remand[] 
cases on grounds that seem justifiable to them but which are not recog-
nized by the controlling statute,"203 to leave for other disputants to 
convince the court precisely how much authority Congress did intend 
to extend. According to this reading, the Court did not adopt the pro-
hibitory reading of section 1447(c). Rather, the Court remained ag-
nostic regarding the statute's precise contours. The holding of 
Thermtron, then, would be merely "that a district court may not re-
mand a case removed from state court on diversity grounds when the 
sole reason for remanding [is] the district court's crowded docket."204 
strued accordingly rather than as distinct enactments ... .' This means that only remand orders 
issued under§ 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein ... are immune from review 
under§ 1447(d).'') (quoting Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 380 (1937)) 
(alteration in original). 
199. 423 U.S. at 345 (footnote omitted). 
200. 423 U.S. at 345 n.9. Note, though, that all the cases cited reflect some ambivalence or 
uncertainty about their conclusions. For example, in Romero v. ITE Imperial Corp, 332 F. 
Supp. 523 (D.P .R. 1971 ), the court qualified its assertion that "[ o )nee the statutory requirements 
for the right of removal have been met, this court cannot order a remand on discretionary 
grounds such as the alleged speedier trial to be afforded the plaintiff," by expending rather more 
ink in disputing "[p]laintiff's argument ... that a remand would speed up the proceedings." 332 
F. Supp. at 526. In Vann v. Jackson, 165 F. Supp. 377 (D.N.C. 1958), the court's conclusion 
ultimately rests on nothing more than its initial allocation of the burden of proof. 165 F. Supp. at 
380-81. 
201. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Assn. v. Seay, 696 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1983); 
Levy v. Weissman, 671 F.2d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 1982); Ryan v. State Bd. of Elections, 661 F.2d 
1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Shell Oil Co., 631 F.2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir. 1980); 14 WRIGHT 
ET Al., supra note 34, § 3739, at 576. But see In re Romulus Community Sch., 729 F.2d 431, 
436 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The Supreme Court's forceful pronouncements in Thermtron against re-
mands unauthorized by statute were prompted by the extreme circumstances of that case."). 
Even after Carnegie-Mellon, courts tend to read Thermtron footnote nine as containing its hold-
ing. See, e.g., Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir. 1989). 
202. 423 U.S. at 344. 
203. 423 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). 
204. Shapiro, supra note 190, at 587 n.271 (emphasis added). 
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B. Carnegie-Mellon and Remand Discretion 
While the Court has not subsequently read Thermtron quite so re-
strictively, it has clearly rejected the prohibitory construction of sec-
tion 1447(c). In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohil/, 205 the Court 
affirmed a basis for remand beyond those expressly authorized by stat-
ute. The Carnegie-Mellon plaintiffs brought suit in state court alleging 
both state and federal causes of action sounding in, inter alia, age dis-
crimination, breach of contract, and wrongful discharge. The univer-
sity defendant then removed pursuant to section 1441(a) on the 
grounds that the district court had original federal question jurisdic-
tion over the federal law claim and pendent jurisdiction over the state 
law claims. Six months later, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to 
delete the federal claims and moved to remand. The district court 
granted the motion while correctly noting that, because it retained 
subject matter jurisdiction over the pendent claims, it lacked explicit 
statutory authorization to remand.206 A divided panel of the Third 
Circuit, reading Thermtron to disallow discretionary remands, issued a 
writ of mandamus ordering the district court to vacate its remand or-
der. Subsequently the Third Circuit granted plaintiffs' petition for re-
hearing en bane and reversed the panel, denying defendants' petition 
for a writ of mandamus without opinion.207 The plaintiffs did not 
question that the pendent jurisdiction doctrine grants the district court 
discretion to dismiss without prejudice a case in which all federal law 
claims have been eliminated and only pendent state law claims re-
main. 208 The issue on certiorari was "whether the District Court 
could relinquish jurisdiction over the case only by dismissing it with-
out prejudice or whether the District Court could relinquish jurisdic-
tion over the case by remanding it to state court as well."209 The 
Supreme Court held that the district court could remand. 
Unquestionably, Carnegie-Mellon holds that, despite Thermtron's 
language to the contrary,210 section 1447(c) does not furnish the sole 
permissible grounds for remand.211 However, it also rejects the notion 
that section 1447(c) might authorize unbounded remand discretion.212 
205. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
206. Boyle v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 648 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (W.D. Pa. 1985), ma11dam11s 
granted sub 11om. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046 (3d 
Cir.), vacated, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1163 (3d Cir. 1986), ajfd .. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
207. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046 (3d Cir.), va-
cated, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1163 {3d Cir. 1986), ajfd., 484 U.S. 343 (1988). For a 
summary of the procedural history of the case, see Steinman, supra note 137, at 950-53. 
208. 484 U.S. at 350 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)). 
209. 484 U.S. at 351. 
210. 484 U.S. at 355 ("The language from Thermtro11 ..• viewed in isolation, is admittedly 
far-reaching, but it loses controlling force when read against the circumstances of that case."). 
211. 484 U.S. at 353-54. 
212. See 484 U.S. at 356 (reaffirming the result in Thermtro11 by terming the district court 
remand order at issue in that case "clearly impermissible"). 
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Consequently, the precise scope for remand discretion that Carnegie-
Mellon allows is unclear. Its immediate result can be predicated on at 
least three different theories of increasing breadth: a district court 
may exercise discretion to remand (1) pendent claims when it has dis-
posed of all federal question claims; (2) any claims that reached it 
through removal, whenever it would have discretion to dismiss them 
without prejudice had the plaintiff originally filed suit in federal court; 
or (3) any claims in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, and 
fairness. This section examines the first two rationales and acknowl-
edges that each enjoys textual support and either scholarly or judicial 
approval. It argues, however, that neither can explain the whole of the 
Court's opinion. This section concludes that the third interpretation 
best captures the reasoning and tone of Carnegie-Mellon. · 
1. Reading One: Remand Discretion Is Limited to Pendent Claims 
Commentators frequently read Carnegie-Mellon only to authorize 
remand of pendent claims.213 Moreover, the Court's own statement of 
its holding would seem to favor this narrow reading.214 The issue, 
however, is whether the Court's ratio decidendi can logically be lim-
ited to pendent claims. The Court presents an ostensible rationale that 
would permit such a limitation. The reasoning appears, stripped to its 
essentials, in a footnote: 
The dissent's claim that our decision renders superfluous the two provi-
sions of the removal statute that authorize remands is unjustified. The 
remand power that we recognize today derives from the doctrine of pen-
dent jurisdiction and applies only to cases involving pendent claims. 
Sections 1441(c) and 1447(c) ... do not apply to cases over which a 
federal court has pendent jurisdiction. Thus, the remand authority con-
ferred by the removal statute and the remand authority conferred by the 
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction overlap not at a11.2 1s 
This mode of analysis should look familiar. Just as the Court in 
Thermtron had read sections 1447(c) and (d) in pari materia,216 here it 
reads the statutory remand provisions in pari materia with the statu-
tory removal provisions: because pendent claims are removed pursu-
ant to judge-made law, and not statutory authority, their remand is 
213. See, e.g., Mengler, supra note 174, at 276 n.137; Charles Rothfeld, Rationalizing Re-
moval, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 225-26 (Carnegie-Mellon provides for remand "when, after 
removal has been effected, all federal claims are dismissed and only pendent state law claims 
remain in the case."); Steinman, supra note 137, at 957-59. It is worth noting that Steinman 
believes that Carnegie-Mellon was wrongly decided, emphasizing that "the grounds for remand 
explicitly stated in the statutes are exclusive." Id. at 959-60, 969, 970. Unfortunately, these 
conclusory assertions constitute the whole of Steinman's argument for the prohibitory construc-
tion of§ 1447(c). 
214. "We conclude that a district court has discretion to remand to state court a removed 
case involving pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the 
case would be inappropriate." 484 U.S. at 357. 
215. 484 U.S. at 355 n.11. 
216. See supra note 198. 
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likewise governed solely by judicial doctrine.2 11 
2. Reading Two: Remand Discretion Tracks Dismissal Discretion 
Lower courts have paid scant attention to the Supreme Court's ef-
fort to cabin remand discretion to those situations - pendent and an-
cillary jurisdiction - in which the exercise of jurisdiction would itself 
be extrastatutory.21 s Rather, the courts of appeals have tended to read 
Carnegie-Mellon to authorize remand discretion coextensive with a 
district court's power of dismissal.219 This reading is warranted by the 
Court's apparent effort to limit Thermtron's bar of extrastatutory re-
mands to situations in which dismissal as well would be unauthor-
ized. 220 If concerns over the costs of delay and the potential tolling of 
the state statute of limitations justify district court discretion to re-
mand rather than dismiss removed pendent claims,221 they should also 
217. Elsewhere the opinion notes: 
The principal flaw in petitioners' argument is that it fails to recognize that the removal 
statute does not address specifically any aspect of a district court's power to dispose of 
pendent state-law claims after removal .... Yet petitioners concede, as they must, that a 
federal court has discretion to dismiss a removed case involving pendent claims. 
484 U.S. at 354. 
218. Of course, the 1990 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 establishes that the exercise of pen-
dent or ancillary jurisdiction is no longer extrastatutory. See infra notes 268-80 and accompany-
ing text. 
219. See, e.g., McDermott Intl. Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters, 944 F.2d 1199, 1202-03 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (contractual forum-selection clause); Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31, 36 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (abstention); see also Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 125 (5th Cir. 
1992) (Eleventh Amendment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1067 (1993). 
Reading Carnegie-Mellon to correct a procedural quirk so as to accord the district courts 
discretion to remand any action on removal that they would be able to dismiss on jurisdictional 
grounds if originally filed in federal court supports the initial assumption of Part II that the 
district court should remand, instead of dismiss, the barred claims of a removed mixed case. See 
supra text accompanying notes 154-58. Of course, the third reading, although broader than the 
second, would also favor remand discretion coextensive with dismissal discretion. See infra notes 
232-33 and accompanying text. Because the district courts do not, and should not, possess dis-
cretion to dismiss the nonbarred claims of a mixed case filed in federal court, adoption of the 
second reading in lieu of the third reading would not provide for mixed-case remand discretion. 
220. 
In Thermtron, the District Court had no authority to decline to hear the removed 
case .... In contrast, when a removed case involves pendent state-law claims, a district court 
has undoubted discretion to decline to hear the case. The only remaining issue is whether 
the district court may decline jurisdiction through a remand as well as through a dismissal. 
The Thermtron opinion itself recognized this distinction by stating that federal courts have 
no greater power to remand cases because of an overcrowded docket than they have to 
dismiss cases on that ground. The implication of this statement, which is confirmed by 
common sense, is that an entirely different situation is presented when the district court has 
clear power to decline to exercise jurisdiction. 
484 U.S. at 356 (citation omitted). 
221. This premise is not uncontested. Professor Steinman has contended that, even if 
Congress had thought about the problem, it still may have preferred dismissal to remand. Stein-
man, supra note 137, at 959. This is presumably because, as Judge Stapleton conceded, dismis-
sals are subject to automatic appellate review whereas remands are, at most, subject to review by 
writ of mandamus. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046, 
1053 (3d Cir. 1986) (Stapleton, J., dissenting), vacated, 45 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 1163 (3d Cir. 
1986), ajfd., 484 U.S. 343 (1988). The significant point at present is that the Carnegie-Mellon 
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justify remand of all removed claims that the district court might 
dismiss. 222 
Moreover, the in pari materia argument - section 1447(c) governs 
statutory removals; extrastatutory remands are permitted over extra-
statutory removals - does not withstand scrutiny. Recall that the 
argument of footnote eleven serves not to justify the holding, but to 
limit it.223 This limitation could be effective only if the Court had 
denied that section 1447(c) precludes remand in cases of extra-
statutory removal, yet simultaneously had affirmed the prohibitory 
construction of section 1447(c) over the universe of statutorily author-
ized removals. 224 The Court avoids such a move throughout its opin-
Court accepted the premise. The implications of limited appellate review for any discretionary 
remand rule are considered infra in text accompanying notes 234-36; infra note 297. 
222. Indeed, the cases cited by the Carnegie-Mellon Court as "approving remand of remain-
ing pendent state-law claims when all federal claims were eliminated from the case," 484 U.S. at 
348 n.5, assert the more general principle that remand discretion should track dismissal power. 
See In re Romulus Community Sch., 729 F.2d 431, 436-40 (6th Cir. 1984); Fox v. Custis, 712 
F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983): 
Remand in removed cases comes to exactly the same thing [as dismissal without prejudice] 
so far as any discernible federal interest is concerned. And of course remand is more direct, 
less costly, and more protective in other ways to the plaintiff who originally chose the state 
forum. To insist that only dismissal without prejudice lies because of a lack of specific 
statutory authority for remand seems an unduly rigid reading of those statutes that do ad-
dress the subject of remand directly. 
712 F.2d at 89 n.4. The third opinion representing that side of the circuit split merely takes the 
propriety of remand for granted, offering no analysis. Hofbauer v. Northwestern Natl. Bank, 700 
F.2d 1197, 1201 (8th Cir. 1983). 
Likewise, before Carnegie-Mellon, both the Second and Ninth Circuits had validated district 
court power to remand removed cases based on prelitigation waiver of forum choice. See Karl 
Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1988) (de-
cided two weeks after Carnegie-Mellon, but making no mention of that case, nor even consider-
ing that remand might be disallowed); Clorox Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 779 F.2d 517 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Pelleport Investors Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
223. That is, the alleged inapplicability of§ 1447(c) to extrastatutory remands does not itself 
dictate that district courts have the discretionary power to remand removed pendent claims. 
After the Court had advanced pragmatic and equitable reasons for permitting remand discretion 
in the case at bar, it dropped footnote 11 to address the dissenters' warning that recognition of 
such considerations would have far-reaching consequences. See supra notes 214-17 and accom-
panying text. 
224. This point requires qualification. In theory, the Court could have sustained the in pari 
materia argument without affirming the prohibitory construction of§ 1447(c) if it had remained 
agnostic concerning whether Congress in fact intended all statutory removals to be governed by 
the statutorily articulated grounds for remand. The Court could then limit remand discretion to 
pendent claims by asserting that the Court lacks power to remand in the face of congressional 
silence. Internal tensions, however, would have prevented the Carnegie-Mel/on Court from mak-
ing this move. To do so would have required it to approve of the Court's assertion, in United 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), of a common law power to assume jurisdiction not 
granted by statute, while simultaneously rejecting a common law power to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction statutorily authorized. 
To be sure, commentators have vigorously debated the validity of Chief Justice Marshall's 
admonition: "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than 
to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution." 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). But Professor Martin Redish is seem-
ingly alone in intimating that the courts might enjoy even less common law power to "decline" 
than to "usurp." See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the 
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ion. 225 In fact, the only support for this move appears in footnote 
eleven, an afterthought offered to rebut the dissent.226 
The problem with the second potential reading - that a district 
court has discretion to relinquish jurisdiction through remand only 
when it has discretion to dismiss removed claims without prejudice -
is that it is simply not consonant with the tenor of the opinion as a 
whole. If the Court perceived itself as merely "filling in" a gap created 
by judicial and congressional oversight, then one would expect it to 
have emphasized the dictates of common sense.227 In other words, 
reduction of Carnegie-Mellon to the second reading would render gra-
tuitous the body of the decision that seems to attribute particular sig-
nificance to pendent claims. The opinion's lengthy discussion of 
pendent jurisdiction and the values it serves makes incredible the 
claim that a single paragraph228 that distinguishes Thermtron by fo-
cusing on the presence or absence of dismissal discretion contains the 
whole of the Court's reasoning. 
3. Reading Three: Remand Discretion Serves Judicial Economy, 
Fairness, and Convenience 
The forgoing analysis indicates that, while both favored readings of 
Carnegie-Mellon reveal some truth, neither is wholly adequate. Ironi-
cally, then, the surface plausibility of, and textual support for, both of 
the first two theories of the opinion draw each into question. What is 
needed is an understanding of Carnegie-Mellon's reasoning that takes 
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 114 (1984) [hereinafter Redish, Abstention] ("Although a 
federal court's decision to infer a private cause of action may arguably invade the legislative 
process, judge-made abstention presents a considerably greater risk of judicial usurpation."). 
More recently, however, Redish has emphasized that the critical inquiry focuses on the court's 
reason for departing from a congressional directive, not on whether the particular departure 
results in the exercise or declination of jurisdiction. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, 
Litigant Choice, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 355-56 (1988) [hereinafter Redish, Judicial Parity]. The 
rationales that really were implicated in Carnegie-Mellon - judicial economy, fairness, and con-
venience - least implicate separation of powers concerns. See generally Shreve, supra note 172. 
225. Most notably, Carnegie-Mellon's characterization of Thermtron would make no sense if 
the Court had adopted the prohibitory construction. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court notes 
the absence of any basis to support the prohibitory inference. See, e.g., 484 U.S. at 353 ("Peti-
tioners argue that the federal removal statute prohibits a district court from remanding properly 
removed cases involving pendent claims. This argument is based not on the language of Congress, 
but on its silence.") (emphasis added). 
226. Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 355 n.11. Also discounting the significance of the in pari 
materia argument is Steinman, supra note 137, at 954 (observing that Carnegie-Mellon's interpre-
tation of Thermtron as inapplicable when dismissal would be authorized "has opened a 
Pandora's Box" and that footnote 11 "will not keep the lid on [it]"). 
227. In similar circumstances, the Court has appealed more expressly to practical reasoning. 
See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837 (1989) (stating that plaintiffs 
"should not be compelled to jump through these judicial hoops merely for the sake of 
hypertechnicaljurisdictional purity"); cf. Staub v. City ofBaxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320 (1958) (hold-
ing a state procedural rule inadequate, strict compliance with which "would be to force resort to 
an arid ritual of meaningless form"). 
228. 484 U.S. at 355-56. 
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seriously both the Court's focus on pendent jurisdiction and its appre-
ciation that discretion to dismiss should entail discretion to remand. 
This dual requirement favors the third and broadest characterization 
of the Court's opinion: remand discretion is generally permissible in 
the interest of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. 
The Court's appeals, on page after page, to the principles of "econ-
omy, convenience, fairness, and comity,"229 suggest that these values, 
and not aversion to jurisdictional hypertechnicality, drive the decision. 
The Carnegie-Mellon dissent reads the Court's opinion in precisely 
this way.230 Again, a single passage from the majority opinion is par-
ticularly illustrative: 
[T]he pendent jurisdiction doctrine is designed to enable courts to handle 
cases involving state-law claims in the way that will best accommodate 
the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, and Gibbs fur-
ther establishes that the Judicial Branch is to shape and apply the doc-
trine in that light. Because in some circumstances a remand of a 
removed case involving pendent claims will better accommodate these 
values than will dismissal of the case, the animating principle behind the 
pendent jurisdiction doctrine supports giving a district court discretion to 
remand when the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is inappropriate.231 
The third reading rests on the insight that the pendent jurisdiction 
doctrine, per se, does no real work in the above analysis. The doctrine 
of pendent jurisdiction itself instantiates the broader principle that 
courts can effectively add to and subtract from statutory grants of ju-
risdiction in the interests of judicial economy, fairness, convenience, 
and comity. Just as the belief that federal courts should exercise their 
discretion in the interests of common law jurisdictional values drives 
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in the first place, this "animating 
principle" alone drives remand discretion.232 The fact that the ani-
mating principle of Carnegie-Mellon was embodied in the doctrine of 
pendent jurisdiction is of no moment. The reasons to prefer remand 
over dismissal likewise arise from considerations of judicial economy, 
convenience, and fairness. 233 Thus, both the first and second readings 
justify remand discretion by reference to the same underlying complex 
of values - judicial economy, convenience, and fairness. 
In sum, of the three proposed readings of Carnegie-Mellon, the 
third coheres best with the specific language and general tenor of the 
opinion. Under this view, district courts enjoy inherent common law 
229. 484 U.S. at 348·51, 353, 357. 
230. 484 U.S. at 359 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T)he Court discovers an inherent authority to 
remand whenever a federal judge decides that 'the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and 
comity' would thereby be served."). 
231. 484 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). 
232. See, e.g., Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1416 (7th Cir. 1989) ("As indi-
cated by Carnegie-Mellon ... the values of judicial economy, fairness, convenience and comity 
justify supplementation of statutory rules with common law doctrines."). 
233. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56; supra note 222. 
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power to remand a case in exceptional circumstances in the interests of 
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. This reading 
alone explains the two most conspicuous features of the opinion: the 
reaffirmation of pendent jurisdiction and the significance it attributes 
to the fact that, in Thermtron, Judge Hermansdorfer lacked both 
dismissal and remand discretion. Importantly, the third read-
ing, although undeniably broad, would still be consistent with other 
Supreme Court common law decisions that disfavor piecemeal 
litigation. z34 
To identify the considerations that fundamentally drove the 
Court's analysis is not to say that Carnegie-Mellon authorizes a district 
court to remand a case whenever it determines that the values of judi-
cial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity so warrant. The 
sharp constraints to appellate review of remand orders militate against 
such an extension of the Court's holding. In other words, although 
Carnegie-Mellon suggests that the federal judiciary enjoys discretion to 
remand removed actions in the interests of judicial economy and fair-
ness, the practical limits to effective appellate review of remand or-
234. Supreme Court doctrines approving lower court discretion to decline jurisdiction to 
avoid piecemeal or duplicative litigation include forum non conveniens and Colorado River ab-
stention. On forum non conveniens, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). For the 
related power to stay rather than transfer proceedings because of related proceedings already 
pending in another federal court, see Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (af-
firming "the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket 
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants"). Colorado River absten-
tion permits a district court to stay or dismiss an action, in exceptional circumstances, in light of 
duplicative state court proceedings. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. I (1983); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 
800 (1976). 
It is at least arguable that the Colorado River doctrine would itself allow discretionary re-
mand of nonbarrcd claims in some instances of mixed-case removal. The paradigmatic situation 
for Colorado River abstention is when the parties are the same in both forums but their posture is 
reversed, as when plaintiff in a state court coercive action is defendant to a declaratory judgment 
action in federal court. However, the barred and nonbarred claims of a mixed case might be so 
similar that the two actions, if bifurcated, would be more properly deemed duplicative than 
piecemeal. An obvious example would be a case consisting solely of § 1983 official and individ-
ual claims. Cf. Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. de11ied, 113 
S. Ct. 1067 (1993). In this instance of mixed-case removal-in which neither the courts nor any 
party apparently contemplated that the presence of a barred claim rendered the action nonrc-
movable - the Fifth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Higginbotham, approved remand of the 
barred state law claims against state defendants in their official capacities. It also upheld the 
district court's order remanding, pursuant to§ !367(c), the nonbarred pendent claims against the 
same state officials in their individual capacities. The court reasoned that "[a]djudicating state· 
law claims in federal court while identical claims arc pending in state court would be a pointless 
waste of judicial resources." 969 F.2d at 125. 
Although abstention is usually effected by dismissal or stay, there is no reason after Carnegie· 
Me/1011 that a district court could not abstain from a removed case by remanding it. See 
Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1988). A 1981 Seventh Circuit decision 
holding the contrary, on the grounds that § 1447(c) provides the exclusive bases for remand, 
Ryan v. State Bd. of Elections, 661F.2d1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1981), would seem to be overruled. 
But see Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1421 n.I (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (asserting, without analysis, 
that "the holding (as opposed to the rationale) that you can't 'abstain' by remanding a case 
doubtless survives Carnegie-Me/1011"). 
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ders235 counsel that such unbridled discretion not be conferred upon 
the district courts. Thus, a lower court can make use of Carnegie-
Mellon 's expansive reasoning only by crafting particularized rules that 
appellate courts could police on mandamus. The Carnegie-Mellon 
holding explicitly creates one such rule: district courts may remand 
pendent claims when all federal question claims are eliminated. The 
opinion also strongly suggests, and lower courts have since actualized, 
a second: district courts may remand claims that they might other-
wise dismiss. Mixed-case removal should reasonably implicate a third: 
district courts may remand claims within their jurisdiction after re-
manding joined claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Presuma-
bly, courts and litigants would, over time, advance other useful and 
manageable rules and standards. 
The inquiry does not end here, however. The superficial support in 
the Carnegie-Mellon opinion for either of two narrower readings, and 
the resulting logical tensions, suggest that the relatively broad reading 
advocated here may not have enjoyed the approval of all Justices in 
the majority. Additionally, the present Supreme Court - which, in 
its constriction of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, has manifested 
considerable hostility to judge-made jurisdictional law236 - is not 
likely to read Carnegie-Mellon expansively.237 Accordingly, it is not 
235. Carnegie-Mellon did not disturb the rule, implied by Thermtron and affirmed in Gravitt 
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723 (1977), that§ 1447(d) prohibits any appellate review 
of remand orders ostensibly predicated on either of the two grounds specified in § 1447(c). The 
prevailing view among the courts of appeals is that nonstatutory remand orders authorized by 
Carnegie-Mellon are reviewable by mandamus only, except that remands in lieu of dismissal that 
follow a substantive decision on the merits - such as interpretation of a contractual forum-
selection clause - are reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 
964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992); Corcoran, 842 F.2d at 34-35 (following, but criticizing, the 
general bar to review by direct appeal of discretionary remand orders). 
236. See infra notes 272-75 and accompanying text. 
237. Predictions are made difficult by the high turnover on the Court in the five years since 
Carnegie·Mellon. Since that five-to-three decision, Justice Kennedy joined the Court; Justices 
Souter and Thomas have replaced Justices Brennan and Marshall, both of whom were in the 
majority; and Justice Ginsburg has replaced the author of the dissent, Justice White. It is note-
worthy, though, that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia remain from a dissent that voted 
to reaffirm Thermtron's avowed holding that district courts cannot remand cases without express 
statutory authorization. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 358 (1988) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
This is, incidentally, a curious position given that all three dissenters joined the Court's opin-
ion in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (per Scalia, J.), reasoning: 
The FTCA, § 1346(b), confers jurisdiction over "civil actions on claims against the United 
States." It does not say "civil actions that include requested relief against the United 
States," nor "civil actions in which there is a claim against the United States" - formula-
tions one might expect if the presence of a claim against the United States constituted 
merely a minimum jurisdictional requirement, rather than a definition of the permissible 
scope of FTCA actions. 
490 U.S. at 552. 
With identical logic, the Carnegie-Mellon majority might have observed: 
Section 1447(c) dictates that "if ... the case was removed improvidently and without juris-
diction, the district court shall remand the case." It does not say "if and only ifthe case was 
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case," 
nor "the district court shall not remand the case unless the case was remanded improvi-
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enough to assess ·how the Court has treated the question of remand 
discretion. It remains to determine how the Court should approach 
the problem if it were next to arise. Part IV does what both Therm-
tron and Carnegie-Mel/on failed to do: it analyzes the legislative his-
tory of section 1447(c) and the relevant context of jurisdictional 
provisions to determine whether courts should interpret the removal 
statutes to permit remand discretion over removed mixed cases. 
IV. REMAND DISCRETION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Part III began with the hypothesis that whether section 1447(c) 
provides the exclusive grounds for remand depends on whether one 
reads the statute's ambiguity to direct (1) that courts shall not remand 
for reasons other than procedural defect or lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction; or (2) that courts may, but are not required to, remand on 
unspecified grounds.238 Clearly, Carnegie-Mellon rejects the prohibi-
tory construction. But, as the preceding section intimated, the Court 
did not quite adopt the permissive construction either. To be sure, the 
Court could have reached the result it did by holding that section 
1447(c) impliedly authorizes the courts to develop a common law of 
discretionary remand.239 Instead, the Court refused to draw any infer-
ences from the statute's silence. It seemed to assume that the lack of 
congressional direction returned the Court to a judicial equivalent of 
the State of Nature, a condition in which, absent legislative mandate, 
it could make law to conform to the demands of judicial economy, 
convenience, fairness, and comity.24o 
The problem with Carnegie-Mellon is that the Court resorted too 
hastily to its purported common law powers to craft jurisdictional law. 
It virtually241 disregarded the prior question whether, utilizing stan-
dently and without jurisdiction" - formulations one might expect if the two conditions 
constituted the sole permissible grounds for remand, rather than merely the only obligatory 
grounds for remand. 
The two arguments are distinguishable only to the extent of one's subjective judgments regarding 
whether the alternative formulations in each passage are what "one might expect." 
238. See supra text accompanying notes 189-92. 
239. An implied authorization of remand discretion need not entail that such discretion is 
unconstrained. See supra note 190. Such a reading, therefore, would not be inconsistent with the 
Court's insistence in both Thermtron and Carnegie-Mellon that a district court does not have 
discretion to remand a case solely because of its overcrowded docket. 
240. The courts of appeals routinely understand Carnegie-Mellon to have created a category 
of lawful, but extrastatutory, remand orders. See, e.g., Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 
1402, 1416 (7th Cir. 1989); Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1988). 
Professor Mengler's recommendation that Congress codify Carnegie-Mellon by amending the 
removal statute, see Mengler, supra note 174, at 276 n.137, further indicates that the Court did 
not engage in statutory interpretation. If Carnegie-Mellon were a statutory decision, it would not 
need to be codified. 
241. The Court did not represent that the removal statute offered no guidance for resolving 
the ambiguity. See 484 U.S. at 354-55: 
[O]ne section of the removal statute strongly suggests that had Congress decided to address 
the proper disposition of removed cases involving pendent claims, Congress would have 
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dard methods of statutory construction,242 it could interpret the stat-
ute's silence to provide meaningful direction.243 This Part delves 
beyond the statute's superficial ambiguity.244 It argues that the re-
moval statute, properly construed, authorizes remand discretion to 
avoid a bifurcated suit. Consequently, mixed-case remand discretion 
need not rest on the Supreme Court's exercise of its common law 
power to supplement jurisdictional statutes. 245 
authorized the district courts to remand them. In 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), Congress dealt with 
the situation in which a claim that would be removable if sued upon alone is joined with one 
or more "separate and independent" claims that are not themselves removable. The section 
provides that the entire case may be removed and that the district court, in its discretion, 
may either adjudicate all claims in the suit or remand the independently nonremovable 
claims .... This section is not directly applicable to suits involving pendent claims . . . . The 
section, however, clearly manifests a belief that when a court has discretionary jurisdiction 
over a removed state-law claim and the court chooses not to exercise its jurisdiction, remand 
is an appropriate alternative. Thus, the removal statute, far from precluding district courts 
from remanding pendent state-law claims, actually supports such authority. 
Although displaying very much the type of reasoning this Part advocates, see infra notes 260-63 
and accompanying text, this lone passage hardly constitutes a sustained effort at statutory 
interpretation. 
242. Of course, the identification of "standard" - let alone appropriate - methods of statu-
tory interpretation has become increasingly problematic in recent years. This Part will examine 
both the recent legislative history of§ 1447(c) and the broader statutory context to serve "imagi-
native reconstruction." See infra note 260 and accompanying text. It is beyond the scope of this 
Note either to canvass the extensive literature on statutory interpretation or to justify its method-
ology against all objections. This Part chooses the approaches it does because, in this particular 
situation, they appear to "work." See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory 
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321-24, 345-62 (1990) (observing 
that, despite the proliferation of fundamentalist interpretative theories, courts properly employ 
practical reasoning that reflects a shifting variety of strategies). 
243. This failing is all the more glaring given the Court's observation the previous term that 
"the touchstone of the federal district court's removal jurisdiction is ... the intent of Congress." 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987). Even Professor Shapiro, the most 
forceful proponent of common law discretion to decline the exercise of congressionally author-
ized jurisdiction, recognizes the necessary priority of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Shapiro, 
supra note 190, at 583 ("Congress has undoubted authority to expand or narrow the range of 
permissible discretion, and the challenge of responsible statutory construction is to determine the 
extent to which it has done so."). 
244. In seeking to resolve a statute's facial ambiguity, interpreters often resort to the so-
called canons of statutory interpretation. No established canon, however, seems to speak to 
§ 1447(c)'s particular ambiguity. The most likely candidate, the interpretive canon, expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, is not helpful. Its lesson could be only that Congress intended that 
procedural defect and lack of subject matter jurisdiction constitute the sole obligatory grounds for 
remand, a premise that this Note does not draw into question. 
Moreover, courts and commentators have strenuously challenged continued use of the ca-
nons, arguing that they rest on unrealistic assumptions about the nature of the legislative process 
and impute omniscience to Congress. See, e.g.. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 689-95 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 278-
83 (1990); Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
452 (1989) ("Almost no one has had a favorable word to say about the canons in many years."). 
Expressio unius has been a favorite target of such criticism, especially for statutory as opposed to 
constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 492 (7th 
Cir. 1988); EsKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra, at 641-42. But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textua/ism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 664 & n.173 (1990) ("Inclusio unius arguments have grown 
like weeds in a vacant lot during the last two Terms of the Court."). 
245. The analytical distinction between an opinion that finds discretion not to exercise juris-
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Section IV.A examines the legislative history of the 1988 
amendment to section 1447(c).246 It concludes that, whatever may 
have been the case prior to the amendment, the present provision does 
not easily sustain the prohibitory construction. On the contrary, it 
reflects probable congressional intent to authorize some degree of re-
mand discretion beyond the grounds articulated. Section IV.B em-
ploys structural reasoning to give content to the unspecified degree of 
discretion that proper statutory interpretation should find in section 
1447(c). To determine whether courts should construe the removal 
statute to authorize remand discretion following mixed-case removal, 
this section returns to the conflicting values outlined in Part II. It 
determines that Congress's pronounced recent bias against jurisdic-
tional rules that force bifurcated litigation outweighs its qualified com-
mitment to the exercise of federal question removal jurisdiction. This 
Part concludes that section 1447(c) should be interpreted, within the 
context of the congressional scheme of removal, to grant district 
courts discretion to remand entire removed mixed cases. 
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c): A Succinct Legislative History 
The Removal Act has a long and convoluted history.247 Thank-
fully, it need not be recounted here. Whether or not early Congresses 
had intended to confer remand discretion, a minor amendment ef-
fected by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 
diction as a matter of statutory interpretation and one that reaches the same result through an 
exercise of the courts' common law power over matters of jurisdiction is firmly entrenched in the 
federal courts literature. Most conspicuously, it provides the foundation for Professor Redish's 
well-known argument that the Supreme Court's abstention doctrines are unconstitutional. See 
generally Redish, Abstention, supra note 224; Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 224, at 348-49. 
While disagreeing vehemently with Redish's separation of powers argument, Shapiro emphasizes 
that courts can exercise their common law power not to hear a case without finding "that 
Congress necessarily 'intends' to confer such discretion when it authorizes the exercise of juris-
diction." Shapiro, supra note 190, at 574; cf Freer, supra note 93, at 56-58 (criticizing the Gibbs 
Court's common law approach, but arguing that pendent and ancillary jurisdiction is properly 
derived from interpreting the statutory term "civil action"). 
Professor Althouse has argued that, when it comes to judicial determinations that lower fed-
eral courts have the discretionary power not to exercise jurisdiction, the alleged difference be-
tween statutory interpretation and judge-made law is illusory. Her point is not that the 
distinction is analytically false, but that it is empirically and prescriptively empty: scholars like 
Redish who seek to foreclose the latter avenue while preserving the former are bound to be 
frustrated. See Ann Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction Law, 
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1035 (1990). Regardless of whether Althouse is right, two points are 
relevant at present. First, the Supreme Court represented that its decision in Carnegie-Mellon 
was the product of common law, and not statutory, methodology. Second, courts and scholars 
have yet to undertake a searching interpretation of§ 1447(c). 
246. The use of legislative history is especially controversial. Justice Scalia in particular has 
launched a well-documented attack on the use of legislative history to trump the "plain lan-
guage" of a statute. See generally Eskridge, supra note 244. More recently, however, even Scalia 
has approved of recourse to the legislative history where, as here, the statute is facially ambigu-
ous. See id. at 658 & n.144. 
247. See Markowski, supra note 189, at 1088-94; see also supra note 63. 
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1988248 renders inquiry into earlier legislative intent unnecessary. 
The 1988 Judicial Improvements Act wrought several changes to 
the Judicial Code. The Act's principal contribution was to create a 
Federal Courts Study Committee to propose changes to federal juris-
dictional law.249 The legislation also, inter alia, increased the jurisdic-
tional minimum in diversity cases;250 amended the Rules Enabling 
Act;251 authorized district courts, for a period of five years, to refer 
actions for nonbinding arbitration;252 and modified section 1447(c) to 
establish a time limit for removals based on procedural defects. 253 
Only one passage in the entire legislative history of the 1988 Act refers 
to section 1447(c). This single paragraph contains one statement pro-
foundly relevant to the instant inquiry. According to the House Re-
port, in amending section 1447(c) to provide that remands based on a 
defect in removal procedure must be sought within thirty days of re-
moval, Congress intended "to avoid any implication that remand is 
unavailable after disposition of all federal questions leaves only State 
law questions that might be decided as a matter of ancillary or pendent 
jurisdiction or that instead might be remanded."254 
This passage unequivocally endorses the result of Carnegie-Mellon. 
More importantly, however, by undermining the prohibitory interpre-
tation, it provides strong support for the permissive construction of 
the statute. After the 1988 amendment, a proponent of the prohibi-
tory construction must believe that Congress intended pendent claims 
to constitute a sui generis exception to the rule that district courts may 
not remand for any reason other than procedural defect or lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Such a proponent must believe, in other 
words, that there exist exactly three permissible grounds for remand. 
But, if so, Congress could have conveyed this intention much more 
clearly by amending the text than by burying the third of three statu-
tory bases for remand in the legislative history. That Congress ex-
pressly recognized one extrastatutory basis for remand, without 
hinting that in so doing it intended to exhaust all permissible grounds 
for remand, implicitly refutes the prohibitory construction. 255 
248. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). 
249. Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4644 (1988). 
250. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 20l(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
(1988)). 
251. Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 401-407, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-52 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2072-2074 (1988)). 
252. Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 901-907, 102 Stat. 4642, 4659-64 (1988). 
253. See supra note 189. 
254. H.R. REP. No. 889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5982, 6033; see also David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision, in 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1446-
1650, at 53 (West Supp. 1993). 
255. In a recent article, Professor Steinman ignores the 1988 amendment to§ 1447(c), reiter-
ating her earlier belief that Carnegie-Mellon was wrongly decided and observing that "it is per-
haps less clear than it was before that the courts have the authority to express their decision to 
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To be sure, Congress could have expressly affirmed the permissive 
construction, but it did not do so. Consequently, the legislative his-
tory of the 1988 amendment of section 1447(c) provides more negative 
than positive information.256 Quite probably, Congress never consid-
ered other possible scenarios that would raise the question whether 
remand might be proper. The final section inquires into Congress's 
"constructive intent" and suggests that had Congress considered the 
problem posed by mixed-case removal, it would have granted district 
courts discretion to remand the nonbarred claims. 
B. Delineating the Contours of Section 1447(c) Remand Discretion 
A recurrent conundrum in statutory interpretation arises when 
text and legislative history reveal that the authors of a statute, as 
amended, simply never envisioned the particular difficulty confronting 
the interpreter. Theorists have propounded numerous strategies to re-
solve the resultant statutory indeterminacy. Commentators at one ex-
treme urge judges to interpret such legislation in accord with their 
own, necessarily subjective, normative judgments,257 despite incessant 
attacks on the "unelected judiciary." At the opposite pole, judicial 
conservatives advocate "strict construction": because Congress legis-
lates against a blank slate, a right, remedy, or power does not exist 
unless Congress has affirmatively and clearly created it.258 However, 
it seems that only a substantive commitment to political conservatism 
can justify such a strong bias in favor of legislative inaction. 259 
decline supplemental jurisdiction over a removed claim by remanding it when no statute autho-
rizes remand." Joan Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdiction in § 1441 Removed Cases: An 
Unsurveyed Frontier of Congress' Handiwork, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 319 (1993). 
256. Of course, the significance of the negative information is considerable. Congress could 
preclude even common law expansions of remand grounds if it so chooses. See Carnegie-Mellon 
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354 (1988). As noted, Shapiro, the chief proponent of jurisdic-
tional discretion, acknowledges that Congress has the power to, and occasionally does, eliminate 
the courts' discretion to decline jurisdiction. See Shapiro, supra note 190, at 547 n.23, 583. 
257. In his well-known chain novel metaphor, Ronald Dworkin would entrust courts to in-
terpret unclear statutes to "best fit" the polity's substantive normative principles. See RONALD 
DWORKIN, LA w's EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); see also Sunstein, supra note 244, at 462-68 (proposing 
that courts craft candidly normative canons of interpretation). 
258. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, SO U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-45, 
552 (1983) (proposing that unless a statute either provides a clear rule of decision or empowers 
courts to fashion common law, it does not apply to the dispute). 
259. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 244, at 290-92. Strict constructionists often justify their 
position with the observation that, even if Congress would probably have preferred a different 
result, Congress can proceed to legislate that change. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 
Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.). Of course, Congress would be just as free to 
amend the statute if the courts interpreted it expansively. 
Moreover, such an argument is overly sanguine - or, more likely, all too realistic - about 
the ease and speed with which Congress can reverse judicial decisions. Congressional inertia is 
especially acute when it comes to jurisdictional legislation. See Roscoe Pound, Reforming 
Procedure by Rules of Court, 76 CENT. L.J. 211, 212 (1913) ("Experience has shown that small 
details of procedure, which sometimes are very irritating in their effects, do not interest the 
legislature so that it is almost impossible to correct them by enactment."); see also Daniel A. 
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This section will adopt a third approach. It will try to imagine 
what Congress would have done had it considered a problem that, ex 
hypothesis, it did not - an endeavor that Judge Posner has approv-
ingly termed "imaginative reconstruction"260 and that the Supreme 
Court has pursued in closely analogous circumstances.261 To be sure, 
the approach is not free of difficulty. Critics have scoffed at the notion 
that judges can "think themselves into the minds of the enacting legis-
lators. "262 This criticism, which can be telling, gains force with the 
passage of time from enactment. However, this section will attempt 
only indirectly to peer into the minds of the legislators; it focuses, 
rather, on their handiwork. 
The challenge, specifically, is to surmise what Congress - that is, 
the Congresses of 1988 and 1990263 - would have directed had it 
Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2, 10 
(1988); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Mul-
tiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 9 (1986) (commenting that minor failings in the 
jurisdictional scheme usually go unaddressed by Congress because "technical aspects of federal 
court jurisdiction rank among the legal topics having the least political appeal."). But see 
Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 383, 420-24 
(1991) (noting that Congress does amend the jurisdictional statutes fairly often); Michael E. 
Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statu-
tory Decisions, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 425, 451 n.120 (1992) (same). 
260. POSNER, supra note 244, at 269-78; POSNER, supra note 175, at 286-93. Imaginative 
reconstruction shares obvious affinities with legal process theory's purposive analysis. See 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LA w 1413-17 (tentative ed. 1958). The central difference is that 
modern imaginative reconstruction, informed as it is by public choice theory, does not assume 
that legislatures pursue uniform and "reasonable" purposes. In reconstructing counterfactual 
intent, it can take better account of Congress's simultaneous pursuit of diverse, even conflicting, 
interests. 
261. In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the Court held that federal courts must dismiss 
habeas corpus petitions that included both claims for which petitioner had exhausted his state 
remedies and nonexhausted claims. Its approach is instructive: 
Because the legislative history of§ 2254, as well as the pre-1948 cases, contains no reference 
to the problem of mixed petitions, in all likelihood Congress never thought of the problem. 
Consequently, we must analyze the policies underlying the statutory provision to determine 
its proper scope .... Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 64 (1953) ("Ar-
guments of policy are relevant when for example a statute has an hiatus that must be filled 
or there are ambiguities in the legislative language that must be resolved."). 
455 U.S. at 516-18 (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 241. 
262. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 25-26 
(1988); Easterbrook, supra note 258, at 550-51. For a critical though less dismissive appraisal, 
see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 242, at 329-32; Sunstein, supra note 244, at 433 & n.99. 
263. The lOOth Congress was the most recent to amend§ 1447(c) itself. The lOlst Congress, 
however, enacted several changes to chapter 89, which is generally termed "the removal statute." 
Although the two Congresses were, by definition, not identical, neither were they fully distinct. 
It would push formalism to extremes to refuse to attribute any of the 1990 legislation that imple-
mented the recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee to the 1988 legislation that 
gave birth to that same Committee. 
Because this section seeks to "reconstruct" the intent of Congresses from the very recent past, 
the endeavor will come to look very much like general contextual reasoning. The Supreme Court 
has especially favored contextual reasoning when interpreting jurisdictional legislation. See 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986): 
If the history of the interpretation of judiciary legislation teaches us anything, it teaches the 
duty to reject treating such statutes as a wooden set of self-sufficient words .... The Act of 
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thought to define a district court's options when, after defendants have 
removed a mixed case, the court must remand claims barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. To answer this challenge, this section tries to 
gauge congressional commitment to each of the conflicting values out-
lined in Part II. First, Congress has consistently invested district 
courts with discretion to avoid a bifurcated suit. Second, Congress has 
enacted, and acceded to, a host of doctrines that serve effectively to 
constrict a defendant's federal question removal privilege. This sec-
tion concludes that the totality of federal jurisdictional legislation 
manifests constructive congressional intent for district courts to pos-
sess remand discretion over mixed cases to avoid a bifurcated suit. 
1. Discretion To Avoid a Bifurcated Suit 
To the extent that a general concern with judicial economy drives 
congressional opposition to piecemeal litigation, it might be worth-
while to examine Congress's repeated actions in recent years to pro-
mote efficient use of judicial resources.264 This section undertakes a 
narrower inquiry, for recent changes in the law of federal jurisdiction 
wrought by the 1988 and 1990 Acts manifest a specific congressional 
commitment to avoid bifurcated suits. A 1988 amendment to the re-
moval act and the 1990 enactment of supplemental jurisdiction pro-
vide telling illustrations. 
First, in the 1988 Act, Congress enacted section 1447(e) to address 
postremoval joinder of diversity-destroying defendants. The provision 
authorizes the district court either to "deny joinder, or permit joinder 
and remand the action to the State court."265 Only Congress's greater 
hostility to expanding diversity jurisdiction outweighed its sentiment 
to grant district courts the even broader discretion to permit joinder 
and retain jurisdiction. 266 Even without this third potential option, 
however, Congress could reasonably have expected that district courts 
will most frequently exercise the second alternative - to permit join-
der and remand to the state court - thereby preventing a bifurcated 
suit.261 
1875 ... has been continuously construed and limited in the light of the history that pro· 
duced it, the demands of reason and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy 
which have emerged from the Act's function as a provision in the mosaic of federal judiciary 
legislation. 
478 U.S. at 810 (quoting Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 
(1959)). 
264. See supra note 180. 
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1988) (corresponding to Judicial Improvements and Access to Jus-
tice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(c)(2), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988)). 
266. See supra note 98. 
267. See Oakley, supra note 182, at 756 (noting that "because the ... option of joinder plus 
remand not only conserves federal judicial resources but is also unappealable, the joinder and 
remand option that Congress took the pains expressly to authorize ought to prove popular with 
federal judges") (footnote omitted). 
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Congress's codification of supplemental jurisdiction probably con-
stitutes the single most compelling indication of congressional com-
mitment to limit drastically piecemeal litigation. Consider the text 
itself: 
§ 1367. Supplemental Jurisdiction 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly pro-
vided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the dis-
trict courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have 
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part 
of the same case or controversy . . . . Such supplemental jurisdiction 
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional 
parties. 
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over a claim under subsection (a) if -
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or 
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 
original jurisdiction, or 
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling 
reasons for declining jurisdiction. 268 
The mandatory terms of subsection (a) combine with the relatively 
strict standards for dismissal outlined in subsection ( c) to create a 
strong presumption in favor of the federal courts' exercise of supple-
mental jurisdiction and a correspondingly small likelihood that the ac-
tion will be bifurcated. Commentators disagree whether the resulting 
discretion to decline exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is the same 
as, or narrower than, that provided by the Supreme Court in United 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 269 and advocated by the Federal Courts Study 
Committee.270 At the very least, however, the first clause of section 
268. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. IV 1992). 
269. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
270. See STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 175, pt. II, at 47-48 (recommending that 
Congress authorize pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and provide the district courts with discre-
tion to dismiss state claims if "warranted in the particular case by considerations of fairness or 
economy"). 
Although the House Judiciary Committee claimed that subsection (c) merely codified existing 
law, H.R. REP. No. 734, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990), Professor Oakley has termed the report 
misleading, demonstrating persuasively that the resulting statutory test for declining supplemen-
tal jurisdiction is more stringent than then-existing law. Oakley, supra note 182, at 766-68 & 
n.118. Professor Larry Kramer, the Reporter to the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal 
Courts and Their Relation to the States, disputes this characterization, claiming that Congress 
intended to codify the Gibbs factors and that any apparent discrepancy is an unintentional prod-
uct of the disjointed legislative drafting process. Personal Communication with Larry Kramer, 
Professor of Law, University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Apr. 12, 1993). 
In any event, Congress clearly rejected the advice of commentators who had urged that it 
"strongly encourage" district courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction when in the interests of 
federalism and comity. See, e.g., Mengler, supra note 174, at 250. 
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1367 strengthens the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction relative to 
the pre-Finley law by preventing the Court from inferring exceptions 
to subsection (a). 
The history animating section 1367 reveals even more than the 
text, for Congress adopted the statute specifically to overrule the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Finley v. United States. 271 Prior to Finley, 
in Aldinger v. Howard 272 the Court had rejected the use of pendent 
party jurisdiction to bring a state law claim against a county on the 
tails of a claim against county officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 
emphasizing that Congress's failure to make municipal corporations 
liable under section 1983 implies a concomitant choice not to extend 
federal jurisdiction to state law claims against the county,273 the Court 
left open the possibility that pendent party jurisdiction could be avail-
able in other circumstances. In particular, the Aldinger Court inti-
mated that pendent party jurisdiction would probably be available 
were the federal claim within exclusive federal jurisdiction, thereby 
forcing the plaintiff either to bifurcate her suit or to drop the state law 
claims: 
When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for exam-
ple, as in the prosecution of tort claims against the United States under 
28 U.S.C. § 1346, the argument of judicial economy and convenience 
can be coupled with the additional argument that only in a federal court 
may all of the claims be tried together.214 
In Finley the Court confronted the exact situation presaged by 
Aldinger but held that the jurisdictional statutes could not be con-
strued to permit pendent-party jurisdiction. It remarked casually that 
"the efficiency and convenience of a consolidated action will some-
times have to be forgone in favor of separate actions in state and fed-
eral courts."275 The dissents,276 followed by academic 
commentators,277 roundly criticized the Finley majority for crafting 
jurisdictional rules that serve to force plaintiffs either to forgo valid 
causes of action or to assume the expense and inconvenience of litigat-
271. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
272. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
273. 427 U.S. at 16-19. The Court subsequently overruled its prior holding that municipali-
ties are not "persons" for purposes of§ 1983 in Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
658 (1978). 
274. 427 U.S. at 18. 
275. Finley, 490 U.S. at 555. 
276. See 490 U.S. at 558 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Where, as here, Congress' preference 
for a federal forum for a certain category of claims makes the federal forum the 011/y possible one 
in which the constitutional case may be heard as a whole, the sensible result is to permit the 
exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction."); 490 U.S. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is 
reason to believe that Congress did not intend that the substance of the federal right be dimin-
ished by the increased costs in efficiency and convenience of litigation in two forums."). 
277. See, e.g., Mengler, supra note 174; see also Wendy C. Perdue, Finley v. United States: 
Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction. 76 VA. L. REV. 539 (1990) (criticizing Finley). 
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ing on two fronts. Congress reacted quickly and decisively, following 
the Federal Courts Study Committee recommendation to enact sup-
plemental jurisdiction.278 The House Report acknowledged that Con-
gress intended to overrule Finley. 219 
The reader will note that Finley produced precisely the same 
Hobson's choice as does mixed-case removal: the plaintiff must either 
bifurcate her suit or forgo potentially valid claims. To preserve the 
opportunity for a single suit, Congress responded to Finley by granting 
district courts discretion to hear claims not otherwise within their lim-
ited jurisdiction.280 Likewise, the inference follows, Congress would 
have responded to Henry by granting district courts discretion to re-
mand claims firmly within their jurisdiction. 
2. The Need for District Courts To Exercise Federal Question 
Removal Jurisdiction 
The situations are not exactly analogous, of course, because the 
congressional response to Finley - section 1367 - expanded federal 
jurisdiction over state law claims. In contrast, the hypothesized-re-
sponse to Henry would entail conferring district court discretion to 
relinquish jurisdiction over federal question claims.281 Clearly, adjudi-
cating questions arising under federal law constitutes the central func-
tion of the federal judiciary. However, whether this distinction makes 
a difference hinges upon the magnitude of congressional commitment 
to the principle that, upon the defendant's election, all federal question 
claims should be adjudicated in federal district court. 
This section reveals that Congress has in fact established several 
doctrines that, in the aggregate, significantly constrain a defendant's 
ability to secure a federal forum to adjudicate questions of federal law. 
Additionally, Congress has impliedly devalued federal question re-
moval pursuant to section 144l(a) by its grant of "absolute" removal 
rights under other provisions of the Judicial Code. This section con-
cludes that congressional commitment to federal question removal ju-
risdiction is not of sufficient intensity to outweigh that body's manifest 
opposition to jurisdictional rules that force piecemeal litigation. 
278. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 175, pt. II, at 47; see also STUDY COMMITTEE 
PAPERS, supra note 93, at 552-59. 
279. H.R. REP. No. 734, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990). 
280. To be sure, § 1367 responds to more than the problem of the bifurcated suit, for it 
permits supplemental jurisdiction even when the federal question claim lies within the states' 
concurrent jurisdiction. Nonetheless, advocates of supplemental jurisdiction seemed particularly 
incensed by the Finley Court's elimination of the opportunity for plaintiff to prosecute all her 
claims in a single forum. See STUDY COMMITTEE PAPERS, supra note 93, at 558; see also supra 
note 276. 
281. It bears emphasis that authorizing remand discretion over mixed cases is not equivalent 
to constricting federal question jurisdiction. Congress would constrict jurisdiction only if it were 
to follow McKay in holding mixed cases to be nonremovable. Investing courts with remand 
discretion confers power to choose to decline jurisdiction. 
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The absence of federal defense removal indicates most conspicu-
ously that Congress perceives only a limited interest in district court 
adjudication of federal questions at defendants' behest. Commentators 
at least since the time of Professor Wechsler have urged that it would 
be more sensible to allow defendants to remove based on a federal 
defense than on a federal claim.282 To be sure, there may be sound 
practical reasons to retain the present system.283 But just as surely, 
the long-standing unavailability of federal defense removal bespeaks a 
widely held perception that the national interest in affording federal 
jurisdiction over questions of federal law diminishes when the defend-
ant rather than the plaintiff seeks the expertise and independence of 
the federal tribunal. 
Less obvious, perhaps, but more telling, is the 1990 amendment to 
section 1441(c). Recall that Congress expanded district court remand 
discretion over separate and independent claims from "matters not 
otherwise within its original jurisdiction" to "matters in which State 
law predominates."284 Questions regarding section 1441(c)'s utility 
notwithstanding,285 the relevant point is that the only effect of the 
change in wording is to enable district courts to remand claims techni-
cally within their "arising under" jurisdiction.286 
There are yet other rules of significance. Consider, for example, 
the bar to appellate review of remand orders embodied in section 
1447(d). Congress enacted the rule "to prevent the additional delay 
which a removing party may achieve by seeking appellate reconsidera-
tion of an order of remand,"287 even though it certainly appreciated 
that the district court would sometimes err in remanding a properly 
removed federal question claim.288 In other words, section 1447(d) 
reflects congressional commitment to reduce litigation delay and har-
assment even at the certain cost that some defendants would be forced 
to defend against federal question claims in state court. The thirty-day 
removal deadline imposed by section 1446289 and the rule that all de-
282. Wechsler, supra note 168, at 233-34. 
283. For example, Judge Posner has argued that defendants' greater incentive to delay ad-
vises against providing for federal defense removal. See POSNER, supra note 175, at 190-91. 
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1441{c) (Supp. IV 1992) (codifying Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 312, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114). See supra note 105. 
285. See supra note 109. 
286. See Siegel, supra note 109, at 5 ("If 'matters' is construed to include all 'claims', then a 
combination of claims in which a federal claim is one but in which state law is found to 
'predominate' may justify a remand of the whole case, with the federal claim included."). Mis-
takenly believing that the 1990 amendment reduced district court remand discretion, Oakley was 
befuddled by the change. See Oakley, supra note 182, at 750 ("It is difficult to see what policy 
interests are served by narrowing a district court's power to remand an unrelated claim after its 
section 1441(c) removal."). 
287. Thermtron Prods. Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 354 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
288. See 423 U.S. at 355 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
289. See supra note 76. 
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fendants must consent to a removal petition290 further evince congres-
sional willingness to constrict defendants' ability to secure a federal 
forum in defense of claims arising under federal law. 
Finally, it bears mention that these several constraints do not ap-
ply equally to all statutory grants of a right to remove. Most notably, 
section 1447(d) expressly excepts from its bar to appellate review of 
remand orders cases removed pursuant to section 1443, which grants a 
right of removal upon persons unable to secure civil rights in state 
court.291 Section 1442(a) permits members of the armed forces to re-
move civil suits beyond the usual thirty days.292 Additionally, courts 
have termed the rights conferred by several distinct removal provi-
sions "absolute" to distinguish them from the right conveyed by 
section 1441(a).293 As one consequence, foreign states can remove ac-
tions pursuant to section 1441(d), and federal officers can remove pur-
suant to section 1442, with or without the consent of codefendants.294 
290. Originally, this rule was probably more a judicial than congressional creation, see supra 
note 75, and recent commentators have criticized the notion that mere legislative silence in the 
face ofjudge·made law signifies congressional acquiescence. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); POSNER, supra note 175, at 282-83; 
Donald L. Doernberg, "You Can Lead a Horse to Water . .. ": The Supreme Court's Refusal To 
Allow the Exercise of Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999, 
1007-09 (1989-1990). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988). Of course, negation of the claim that silence necessarily manifests 
approval does not entail affirmation of the contrary claim that silence cannot indicate assent. See 
Farber, supra note 259, at 8-11. Given Congress's certain awareness of the unanimous consent 
doctrine, and many opportunities to amend it, it is reasonable to infer that the rule represents 
congressional will. 
291. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1447(d) (1988); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (b)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1992) 
(providing for direct appellate review of orders remanding actions removed by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation). 
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1442a (1988). 
293. For a thorough discussion citing numerous cases, see 14A WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 
34, §§ 3727-3729. Courts have conferred heightened status upon 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988) 
(permitting removal by foreign states); 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1988) (removal by federal officers); 28 
U.S.C. § 1442a (1988) (removal by members of the armed forces); 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1988) (pro-
tection of civil rights); 28 U.S.C. § 1444 (1988) (foreclosure actions against the United States). 
294. See, e.g., Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1375 (5th Cir. 
1980) (noting that legislative history of§ 144l(d) suspends the unanimous consent rule); Behre v. 
United States, 659 F. Supp. 747 (D.N.H. 1987) (removal pursuant to § 1442(a)(l)). 
Behre is a complex and interesting case. Plaintiffs filed suit in New Hampshire state court 
alleging federal and state causes of action and naming, among others, federal officers, state agen-
cies, and private individuals. The federal officers removed pursuant to § 1442(a). Plaintiffs 
moved to remand, "arguing that the Eleventh Amendment bars [the federal court] from exercis· 
ing jurisdiction over the state defendants and that reasons of judicial economy, comity, and re-
spect for civil rights plaintiffs' choice-of-law forums militate in favor of remanding the entire 
action." 659 F. Supp. at 748. Only the federal officers objected to remand. 
The court remanded the claims against the state defendants on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds. It also held that § 1442 confers an absolute right of removal upon the federal officers 
thereby precluding remand. Finally, the court remanded the claims against the remaining de-
fendants, reasoning as follows: 
Except for Counts One and Two, all of the claims against these defendants arise under state 
law. Moreover, these parties did not seek the removal to this court, nor did they object to 
plaintiffs' motion to remand. Given that this action must unfortunately be litigated in two 
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The significant point, of course, is that not all grants of removal 
jurisdiction are equally important. The extension of removal rights to, 
for example, foreign states and federal officers is sufficiently compel-
ling29S that Congress and the courts have chosen to relax otherwise 
applicable restrictions on removal. The right of removal under section 
1441(a), it necessarily follows, is of a lesser order. Thus, Congress has 
devalued federal question removal relative both to original federal 
question jurisdiction and to particular removal grants.296 
Federal jurisdiction over difficult questions of federal law might be 
extremely important. But Congress does not deem federal question 
jurisdiction over run-of-the-mill claims, at a defendant's behest and 
over the plaintiff's objection, sufficiently important to trump its grow-
ing aversion to jurisdictional rules that effectively force piecemeal liti-
gation. The general policy in favor of federal question removal is 
riddled with exceptions and procedural limitations that reflect con-
gressional willingness to allow district courts not to exercise removal 
jurisdiction over federal questions. Consequently, if Congress were to 
address this situation, it very likely would expressly authorize discre-
tion to remand mixed cases removed pursuant to section 144l(a).297 
forums, the Court finds that justice would best be served by remanding all of the defendants 
other than the individual federal officers to state court. 
659 F. Supp. at 751. The court did not address whether it would have remanded the federal 
causes of action against the private defendants had they objected. 
295. See, e.g., Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969): 
[T]he federal government "can act only through its officers and agents, and they must act 
within the States. If, when thus acting ... those officers can be arrested and brought to trial 
in a State court, for an alleged offence against the law of the State .•• and if the general 
government is powerless to interfere at once for their protection, - if their protection must 
be left to the action of the State court, - the operations of the general government may at 
any time be arrested at the will of one of its members." For this very basic reason, the right 
of removal under § 1442(a)(l) is made absolute .... 
395 U.S. at 406 (quoting Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879)); H.R. REP. No. 1487, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6631 ("In view of the 
potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform 
body of law in this area, it is important to give foreign states clear authority to remove to a 
Federal forum actions brought against them in the State courts."). 
296. For further recognition that not all grants of federal jurisdiction are created equal, see 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 176, § 4.01, at 221 (proposing a "Complex Litiga-
tion Panel" to manage complex multidistrict litigation and excepting from the panel's authority 
to transfer actions from federal to state court cases removed to federal court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 144l(d), 1442, 1443, and 1444). 
297. A permissive construction of§ 1447(c) need not disturb the regime created by the inter-
action of Thermtron and Carnegie-Mellon: remands for a reason other than procedural defect or 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction might be lawful, but are subject to appellate review by manda-
mus. True, the availability of any appellate review of remand orders cuts against the concern 
with judicial economy that, in part, underlies the argument for mixed-case remand discretion. 
But, if appellate review of discretionary remand orders proves too wasteful of judicial resources, 
the review mechanism can be reformed to minimize delay and expense. See Jerome I. Braun, 
Reviewability of Remand Orders: Striking the Balance in Favor of Equality Rather than Judicial 
Expediency, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79 (1990) (proposing summary appellate procedures, 
including review by a single appellate judge instead of the customary three-judge panel in all 
cases of remand in which removal is predicated on a federal question, and terming the conse· 
quent increase in workload "insignificant"). Practical limits upon appellate review of discretion-
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But this prediction does not countenance waiting for explicit congres-
sional affirmation. 298 Following established principles of statutory 
construction, lower courts should assume that discretion now. 
CONCLUSION 
The presence of claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment does 
not prevent removal of a case that also contains federal question 
claims against private defendants. After removal, the Amendment 
bars the district court from adjudicating the plaintiff's claims against 
the state defendants. The district court should remand rather than 
dismiss the barred claims. Considerations of judicial economy, con-
venience, and fairness to the plaintiff all disfavor the resulting bifur-
cated suit. Accordingly, sound policy reasons advise that the district 
court should remand the nonbarred claims as well if these factors out-
weigh the importance that a federal court exercise its jurisdiction over 
the federal questions presented in the particular case. No court has 
yet contemplated that it might possess the power to remand those 
claims on such discretionary grounds. This Note has identified and 
sought to rectify this unfortunate oversight. District courts probably 
enjoy common law power, under the Supreme Court's opinion in Car-
negie-Mellon University v. Cohill, to remand cases in exceptional cir-
cumstances in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, and 
fairness. Similarly, the most reasonable construction of the remand 
statute authorizes district court discretion to remand claims in order 
to avoid a bifurcated suit. Consistent with either analysis, a district 
court need not adjudicate the nonbarred federal question claims of a 
removed case after it has remanded claims barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment to state court. In cases not involving the Eleventh 
Amendment, it remains for creative courts and litigators to investigate 
more fully the implications of both the common law and statutory 
approaches to discretionary remand. 
ary remand orders should not occasion alarm. Cf. Mengler, supra note 174, at 277 (noting that 
much of a district court's present discretionary power is "largely unreviewable"). 
298. See supra note 259. 
